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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 20050613-CA 
ISIAHBO'CAGEVOS, 
Defendant/Appellant : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from first-degree felony 
convictions upon transfer from the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)(a) 
(2002), § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). The Utah Supreme Court transferred Mr. Vos's appeal on 
September 28, 2005. (R. 254.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue 1: Whether the attorney who represented Isiah Bo'Cage Vos when Mr. Vos 
surrendered to police and for a short time thereafter provided ineffective assistance that 
caused real or presumptive prejudice. 
Standard of Review: 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, ma defendant must 
show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different.'" 
Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ^ 20, 94 P.3d 211 (quoting Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 
72, \ 19, 61 P.3d 978 (additional citation omitted)). 
"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is usually a mixed question of law and 
fact." State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing State v. Templin, 
805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 
reh }g denied 467 U.S. 1267 (1984))). Where the record illustrates what transpired below, 
the court may determine whether representation was ineffective as a matter of law. 
Johnson, 823 P.2d at 487 (citing Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 
133-34 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
If counsel had an actual conflict of interest, or the defendant was constructively 
denied legal counsel, prejudice is presumed. State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 533 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert denied 945 P.2d 1118 (1997) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692). Other 
deficiencies that render a proceeding fundamentally unfair may also warrant a 
presumption of prejudice. Id. 
If counsel, through deficient performance, fails to suppress evidence gained in 
violation of the defendant's rights, prejudice is established unless the admission of the 
evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 981-82 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998); State v. Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862, 867 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Preservation: This issue is appropriately raised for the first time on appeal when 
the defendant is represented by counsel other than trial counsel, and the trial record is 
adequate to permit a decision on the issue. State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 n.l (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991)). Moreover, 
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the attorney's ineffective assistance was also before the district court pursuant to Mr. 
Vos's pretrial Motion to Suppress Statement (Feb. 14, 2005). (R. 64-65 (the motion); R. 
115-120 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law denying the motion to suppress). The 
trial court's Findings and Conclusions are attached as Addendum C; the transcript of the 
suppression evidentiary hearing (R. 259) is attached as Addendum D. 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Vos voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966), prior to giving police an incriminating statement. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress 
are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Its conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Miller, 2004 UT App 445, U 5, 104 P.3d 1272 (quoting State v. 
Veteto, 2000 UT 62, If 8, 6 P.3d 1133). Where a defendant's constitutional rights are 
violated, reversal is required unless it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
violation was harmless. State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(citing State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213-1214 (Utah 1989)). 
Preservation: The issue was preserved by Mr. Vos's pretrial Motion to Suppress 
Statement (Feb. 14, 2005). (R. 64-65.) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend. VI, and Utah Const, art. I, § 12: Addendum A. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2003): Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 26, 2004, Mr. Vos was charged by Information with one count of 
Criminal Homicide, Murder, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
203 (2003). (R. 1-3.) A preliminary hearing was convened on January 14, 2005, and Mr. 
Vos was bound over for trial. (R. 50-51.) Mr. Vos was arraigned on February 4, 2005. 
(R. 57-59.) Mr. Vos moved to suppress a statement made to police on February 14, 2005. 
(R. 64.) Following a March 14, 2005 evidentiary hearing (R. 76), the trial court denied 
Mr. Vos's motion on April 12, 2005, finding also that Mr. Vos had not received 
ineffective assistance of counsel leading up to the statement. (R. 115-120, 210.) On 
April 13, 2005, following a two-day jury trial, Mr. Vos was found guilty of Criminal 
Homicide, Murder. (R. 113-14, 148-49.) On June 10, 2005, pursuant to a one-year 
firearms enhancement, Mr. Vos was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term of from 
six years to life, with credit recommended for 231 days already served. (R. 215-16.) The 
Minutes of the Sentence, Judgment and Commitment, are attached as Addendum E. The 
Notice of Appeal and Corrected/Amended Notice of Appeal were filed on July 8 and July 
13, 2005, respectively. (R. 222-23, 224-25.) A stipulated motion to unseal certain 
records and to complete the trial transcripts was granted. Mr. Vos filed a motion seeking 
to supplement the record with a transcript of a jailhouse interview on or about February 
27, 2006. The motion was denied by order dated May 11, 2006. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A, The Incident 
Jeffery Maestas was shot the afternoon of October 21, 2004 on 700 North, near the 
northeast corner of 700 North and Star Crest Drive. (R. 260 at 73-75.) 
A driver heading north on Star Crest Drive was making a right-hand turn to go 
east on 700 North when she heard several pops. After making the turn, she turned to look 
over her shoulder and saw two men running between parked cars and onto the lawn of a 
house. A smaller man was chasing a larger man with a pistol. The larger man turned to 
face the smaller man and put his hands up. According to this witness, the larger man did 
not look happy. (R. 260 at 39-43.) This witness could not identify Mr. Vos as being 
involved in the incident. (Id. at 49.) 
A man who coached Mr. Vos's little-league football team several years ago saw 
Mr. Vos walking along Star Crest Drive, a block north of 700 North, some five to eight 
minutes before the shooting. (R. 260 at 50-53, 75.) This witness did not testify to seeing 
any confrontation involving Mr. Vos or the victim. 
A different driver was heading east on 700 North. While stopped for a red light at 
Star Crest Drive, she saw Mr. Maestas park a car pointing east along the north curb of 
700 North. He exited the passenger side (into the street) and walk around the back of the 
car toward a pedestrian. When they were five to six feet apart, she saw the pedestrian 
pull out a gun and start firing. It looked to her as though Mr. Maestas started retracing 
his steps toward the passenger side of the parked car. She turned left to head north on 
Star Crest Drive. A few moments later, through her rear-view mirror, she saw the 
pedestrian enter the passenger side of a teal Ford Explorer. (R. 260 at 107-09.) She 
drove around the block and met the Ford Explorer driving towards her on a different 
street. She did not look at the occupants because she was trying to see the license plate. 
(Id. at 110.) This witness did not identify Mr. Vos as being involved in the shooting. 
Another driver was heading west on 700 North and stopped for a red light at Star 
Crest Drive. The light turned green and he saw a person chasing a heavyset person up a 
driveway. The smaller person appeared to be holding a gun by the barrel as though 
intending to strike the larger person with the gun's butt. This driver did not hear any 
shots. (R. 260 at 149-51.) He did not identify Mr. Vos as being involved in the incident. 
The state subpoenaed Anthony Ferguson, the driver of the teal Ford Explorer, to 
testify at trial. Mr. Ferguson did not appear to testify. The court indicated it would issue 
a warrant for Mr. Ferguson's arrest. (R. 260 at 123-24.) 
The Information charging Mr. Vos with murder declares that Mr. Ferguson said 
Mr. Vos asked him for a ride near the place and time of the shooting. (R. 2-3.) The 
Information does not state that Mr. Ferguson witnessed any altercation. (See id.) At trial, 
where Mr. Ferguson was subpoenaed to testify, the prosecution mentioned in its opening 
statement that Mr. Ferguson gave Mr. Vos a ride; the prosecution did not mention that 
Mr. Ferguson saw any altercation. (R. 260 at 28-29.) Det. Parks testified at trial that Mr. 
Ferguson identified Mr. Vos as the person who asked for a ride near the place and time of 
the shooting. (Id. at 90.) The detective did not testify that Mr. Ferguson saw an 
altercation between Mr. Vos and the victim. (See id.) During a pretrial evidentiary 
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hearing, Salt Lake City Detective Parks stated that Mr. Ferguson witnessed an altercation 
involving Mr. Vos, but did not see a gun or hear shots. (R. 259 at 11-12.) 
B. Mr. Vos's Pre-Trial Statement. 
The shooting incident occurred October 21, 2004. (R. 260 at 73-74.) The Salt 
Lake City Police Department identified Mr. Vos as a primary suspect early on October 
22, 2004. (Id. at 89-90.) John Bucher, a member of the Utah State Bar, was retained by 
the Vos family to represent Mr. Vos on October 22, 2004. (R. 259 at 20-21.) Just after 
noon that same day, Mr. Vos's uncle informed police that Mr. Vos wished to surrender. 
(Id. at 6-7.) Approximately four hours later, Mr. Vos surrendered to police at Mr. 
Bucher's law office. (Id at 7.) 
The defendant was not read his Miranda rights when he surrendered to police. (R. 
259 at 7 (no "Miranda }d statement" was taken at that time).) As of October 27, 2004, 
five days following Mr. Vos's surrender to police, Det. Parks admits he "probably" told 
Mr. Bucher that there were eyewitnesses who could identify Mr. Vos. (R. 259 at 10.) In 
conversations with Mr. Bucher and Mr. Vos's mother, the detective admits saying there 
were eyewitnesses, but not telling either the attorney or the mother that these eyewitness 
could not identify Mr. Vos as the man who fired the gun. (Id. at 11.) 
Mr. Bucher testified at the subsequent evidentiary hearing on Mr. Vos's motion to 
suppress (the "evidentiary hearing") that he was informed that the driver of the Ford 
Explorer could identify Mr. Vos, and that there were witnesses who could identify Mr. 
Vos as the "shooter." (R. 259 at 22; Add. D.) From this, Mr. Bucher assumed there were 
"several" witnesses who could identify Mr. Vos as the person who shot Mr. Maestas. (Id. 
at 22-23.) Mr. Bucher concluded that Mr. Vos should plead some form of self-defense 
based primarily upon the erroneous belief that "several" witnesses could identify Mr. Vos 
as the "shooter." (Id. at 23.) The detective's misstatements regarding eye witnesses had 
a "strong influence" on Mr. Bucher's decision to tell the detective that Mr. Vos was 
involved in the shooting. (Id.) 
On October 27, 2004, Mr. Bucher told Det. Parks that Mr. Vos wished to make a 
statement. (R. 259 at 8.) Mr. Bucher told the detective "that identity wasn't an issue, 
that the case had self-defense aspects ... and they were going to claim a defense of 
imperfect self-defense is what he called it." (Id. at 19.) At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. 
Bucher confirmed his intent to rely upon a claim of "imperfect self-defense." (Id. at 30.) 
Mr. Bucher, however, has no recollection of seeing any discovery or statements 
prior to October 27, 2004, other than, perhaps, "a police report." (R. 259 at 25-26; id. at 
28 (Mr. Bucher believes he saw the Information filed against Mr. Vos, and perhaps other 
discovery, but he cannot be sure).) No evidence exists that Mr. Bucher interviewed any 
witnesses or read their statements before advising his client to detail his involvement. 
Also on October 27, 2004, before they entered the jail together, Mr. Bucher told 
the detective that he (the detective) should not ask any questions about the weapon used 
in the shooting. Mr. Bucher told the detective that the weapon had been destroyed. (R. 
259 at 10, 29.) Mr. Bucher confessed this at the same time he considered the lack of the 
weapon to constitute a weakness in the case against Mr. Vos. (Id. at 23.) 
Sometime before he and the detective confronted Mr. Vos inside the jail on 
October 27, 2004, Mr. Bucher told Mr. Vos "how to do the case." (R. 259, at 24.) Mr. 
8 
Bucher, however, had not told Mr. Vos that he should detail his involvement in the 
shooting. (Id. at 32; see id. at 24 (Mr. Bucher concedes, "Exactly what the statement was 
and when it was going to take place, I don't think [Mr. Vos] knew that.5').) 
When first confronted by both Mr. Bucher and Det. Parks at the jail on October 
27, 2004, Mr. Vos was surprised. (R. 259 at 33.) Mr. Vos wanted to know why the 
detective was present. (Id.) Mr. Vos did not want to make a statement. (Id.) Mr. Vos 
initially refused to give a statement; Det. Parks left the room so Mr. Bucher and Mr. Vos 
could confer. (Id.) Mr. Vos was not read his Miranda rights during this initial 
confrontation. (See id. at 12.) 
When Mr. Vos refused to talk to the detective, he and Mr. Bucher talked privately. 
(R. 259 at 26.) Mr. Bucher erroneously advised Mr. Vos that the police "had a 
substantial amount of evidence" along with more than one witness who could identify 
Mr. Vos. (Id. at 26-28, 33-34.) When asked at the evidentiary hearing if he had to "talk 
Mr. Vos into giving this statement," Mr. Bucher testified: "It was close, it was close. He 
did not - he didn't see my point of view on the thing, but I took that as his lack of 
experience in this kind of thing." (Id. at 27.) Mr. Bucher "kept insisting and kept 
insisting" that Mr. Vos make a statement. (Id. at 33.) 
During this meeting in which Mr. Bucher "kept insisting and kept insisting" that 
Mr. Vos detail his involvement to the detective (R. 259 at 33), Mr. Bucher did not advise 
Mr. Vos that Mr. Vos was entitled to refuse to give a statement. (Id. at 34.) 
When the interrogation resumed, the detective did not read Mr. Vos his Miranda 
rights. (R. 259 at 13.) When asked at the evidentiary hearing why he did not Mirandize 
Mr. Vos when the interrogation resumed, the detective testified, "His attorney was 
present and represented him on that matter," (Id.) 
Further regarding Mr. Vos's Miranda rights, the detective initially testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that, when the interrogation resumed, Mr. Bucher was going to 
"waive [Mr. Vos's] rights" on Mr. Vos's behalf. (Id. at 15; R. 117, Tf 8 (trial court finds 
that as the interrogation resumed, Mr. Bucher waived reading of the warnings).) His 
recollection was then refreshed from the interrogation transcript. (Id. at 15-16.) Based 
thereon, the detective testified that Mr. Bucher advised Mr. Vos of his right to remain 
silent, and that Mr. Bucher purported to waive Mr. Vos's right to remain silent: 
Q [by prosecuting attorney]: Now, having had an opportunity to reread the 
transcript, does that refresh your recollection on whether Mr. Bucher said 
anything about rights? 
A [by the detective]: Yes. 
Q: And what do you recall now? 
A: Mr. Bucher advised his clients [sic] of his constitutional rights to remain 
silent, and they decided to make the statement. 
(Id. a t l6;R. 117, If 9.) 
Mr. Bucher testified at the evidentiary hearing that Mr. Vos needed to make a 
statement to either (1) proceed under a self-defense theory, (2) secure a plea bargain, or 
(3) secure a reduction in bail so Mr. Vos might "get out of jail and out of town for a while 
because things were hot." (R. 259 at 25.) 
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Mr. Bucher had not spoken with the prosecuting attorney before Mr. Vos's 
October 27, 2004 statement. (R. "EXHIBITS," Def. Ex. 1; attached as Addendum F.1) 
At no time prior to October 27, 2004 did Mr. Bucher receive a promise of leniency in 
exchange for Mr. Vos's statement. (R. 259 at 30-31.) Rather, Mr. Bucher was "flying on 
an assumption" that if he and Mr. Vos told the detective that Mr. Vos was involved in the 
shooting, the detective would tell the prosecuting attorney, and this would help with 
future negotiations. (R. 259 at 26.) 
At the time of his arrest, Mr. Vos was an unmarried eighteen-year-old unemployed 
student. (R. 261 at 184; see id. at 195.) Also at this time, members of the victim's gang 
were "causing some significant trouble to [Mr. Vos's] mother," and Mr. Vos was at risk 
of physical harm from this gang. (R. 259 at 25.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point 1: Mr. Bucher provided deficient representation when he: (1) usurped Mr. 
Vos's right to decide, or even have input into, the objectives of representation; (2) 
revealed confidential attorney-client communications without Mr. Vos's permission; (3) 
failed to conduct even minimal discovery before insisting that Mr. Vos admit his 
involvement; and (4) failed to ensure Mr. Vos voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently 
The defense exhibit is a stipulation received at the suppression hearing in which the 
prosecuting attorney states he "believes" he spoke with Mr. Bucher "several days after 
screening and filing charges against [Mr. Vos]...." The case was screened on October 
25, 2004 (R. 259 at 8), and the Information was filed on October 26, 2004 (R. 1). Thus, 
"several days" after October 25th or 26th indicates the prosecuting attorney and Mr. 
Bucher did not speak before October 27th. 
waived his Miranda rights prior to detailing his involvement. No legitimate trial strategy 
validates these decisions. 
Point 2: Prejudice may be presumed where defense counsel: (1) has an actual 
conflict of interest; (2) effectively abandons his client, thereby constructively denying 
him the assistance of counsel; or (3) provides assistance that so erodes confidence in the 
underlying proceedings that any further attempt to identify actual prejudice is rendered 
unnecessary and ill-advised. Mr. Bucher created an actual conflict of interest when he 
confessed his client to manslaughter, handed the prosecution the key element of a 
homicide charge, and potentially became a witness for the prosecution. Mr. Bucher's 
unilateral decision to disclose facts that confessed Mr. Vos to manslaughter, and his 
insistence that Mr. Vos detail his involvement before conducting discovery constitutes a 
constructive denial of counsel. Mr. Bucher's representation was so deficient as to render 
further investigation into actual prejudice unnecessary and ill-advised. 
Point 3: In the alternative, Mr. Vos suffered actual prejudice. Minimal discovery 
would have revealed the prosecution's lack of direct evidence. The prosecution used Mr. 
Vos's admissions at trial to convict him of murder. The prosecution used the admissions 
at trial to seriously undermine Mr. Vos's self-defense claim. It cannot be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Bucher's failure to ensure Mr. Vos's understanding 
of his self-incrimination rights was harmless. 
Point 4: A defendant may not, as a matter of law, waive the reading of the 
Miranda warnings. Nor may waiver of rights of which he was never informed be deemed 
valid. The only right waived on the record was the right to remain silent - and that was 
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by Mr. Bucher. The trial court erred in concluding that that Mr. Vos waived his Miranda 
rights voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. It cannot be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Vos's statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE FELL BELOW AN 
OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS. 
Mr. Bucher's representation leading up to both his and his client's incriminating 
statements falls below an objective standard of reasonableness on several levels. The 
trial court's findings and conclusions to the contrary are in error. 
Both the federal and Utah constitutions guarantee an accused's right to effective 
assistance of counsel. U.S. Const, amends. VI, XIV; Utah Const. Art. I, § 12; see 
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel 
typically "must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different." 
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ^ 23, 84 P.3d 1183 (quoting Wickham, 2002 UT 72, If 19). 
A criminal defendant is constitutionally guaranteed effective counsel to "justify 
reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. The very 
essence of defense counsel's function "is to make the adversarial testing process work in 
the particular case." Id. at 690. 
Sections A through D, below, address four specific examples of objectively 
unreasonable representation. Section E explains why Mr. Bucher's decisions cannot be 
considered legitimate trial strategy. 
A. Mr. Bucher Usurped Mr. Vos's Right to Decide the Objectives of 
Representation. 
Mr. Bucher effectively confessed Mr. Vos to manslaughter, having decided 
without consulting Mr. Vos that a claim of "imperfect self-defense" was Mr. Vos's only 
plausible defense. (R. 11, If 6.) See State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, fflj 8-9, 63 P.3d 94 
(imperfect self-defense claim may reduce murder charge to manslaughter) (citing Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a) (re-codified at § 76-5-203(4)(a) (2003))). By so doing, Mr. 
Bucher violated the tenet universal to the American justice system that a lawyer "shall 
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation." Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (2006); Model Rules of Prof 1 Conduct R. 1.2(a) (2005) 
(same). 
Some cases distinguish between the objectives of representation, which must be 
determined by the client, and the means of representation, which may be determined by 
counsel. However, a neat line between objectives and means cannot always be drawn. 
Bradford v. State, 759 So.2d 434, 440 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). Moreover, even regarding 
issues over which the attorney may make the final decision, the matter should first be 
discussed with the client whenever possible. Where attorney and client disagree about 
the means to achieve the desired objective, the lawyer should "consult with the client and 
seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement." Model Rules of Prof 1 
Conduct, R. 1.2, cmt. 2 (2005); accord ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-5.2 (2005) 
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("Strategic and tactical decisions should be made by defense counsel after consultation 
with the client where feasible and appropriate"). 
Such consultation is all the more reasonable - and necessary - at early stages of 
representation. Especially where a decision involves significant issues and legal 
consequences, there is opportunity to consult, and the decision implicates the very nature 
of the adversarial system, consultation is essential. U.S. ex rel. Brown v. Warden, 417 
F.Supp. 970, 973 (N.D. 111. 1976). Accord Lanier v. State, 486 P.2d 981, 988 & n.17 
(Alaska 1971) (client must always be consulted regarding tactical decisions that implicate 
constitutional rights that are made outside of "trial[-]type proceedings"). 
Mr. Bucher's statement to the detective involved a decision with significant legal 
consequences. It occurred at an early stage of proceedings where there existed no 
pressing need or pressure to detail his client's involvement. Mr. Bucher admitted Mr. 
Vos's involvement without consulting Mr. Vos. Mr. Vos had not approved of any such 
admission. (R. 259 at 32; see id. at 24 (Mr. Bucher recalls telling Mr. Vos "how to do the 
case," but not telling Mr. Vos about making a statement)). In fact, when they did finally 
discuss making a statement, Mr. Vos was "reluctant" and "uncomfortable" about 
detailing his involvement. (R. 259 at 25, 26, 33-34.) Mr. Vos wanted to force the 
prosecution to prove his involvement.2 (R. 259 at 27 (Mr. Bucher testified, "At one point 
1 think [Mr. Vos] said, 'Could we do both, could we question my identity and still do a 
self-defense or modified self-defense?'").) 
2
 See Utah Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (Supp. 2005) ("A lawyer for the 
defendant in a criminal proceeding ... [may] defend the proceeding as to require that 
every element of the case be established"). 
In response to his client's wholly reasonable concerns about this decision from 
which there could be no return, Mr. Bucher did not invite consultation or dialogue. 
Instead, Mr. Bucher dismissed Mr. Vos's refusal to give a statement as a sign of Mr. 
Vos's naivete, as Mr. Bucher's testimony at the evidentiary hearing makes clear: 
Q (by subsequent defense counsel): Did you say - in your opinion, did you 
have to talk Mr. Vos into giving this statement? 
A (by Mr. Bucher): It was close, it was close. He did not - he didn't see 
my point of view on the thing, but I took that as his lack of experience in 
this kind of thing. I don't - 1 can't remember what his criminal record is, 
but he's never been involved in anything like this, so I took his reluctance as 
a lack of experience rather than he knew something I didn't know. 
(R. 259 at 27.) 
Mr. Bucher denied Mr. Vos any opportunity to define objectives, or even to give 
input into strategy. There were no pressing deadlines requiring such hasty action. Mr. 
Bucher could certainly have consulted with Mr. Vos before telling the detective that Mr. 
Vos was involved, and then insisting that Mr. Vos give a statement. 
B. Mr. Bucher's Unilateral Decision to Disclose Mr. Vos's Involvement Violated 
the Attorney's Duty to Maintain Attorney-Client Confidentiality. 
Mr. Bucher provided representation that falls below an objective standard of 
reasonableness when he violated attorney-client confidentiality. This violation led to Mr. 
Vos's waiver of privilege as well as the specter of Mr. Bucher becoming the 
prosecution's star witness. 
Except under circumstances not applicable here, "A lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, 
[and] the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation...." 
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Utah Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(a) (2006). Utah Rule of Evidence 504 
(2006), in turn, creates a privilege that permits the client to refuse to testify, and to 
prevent others from testifying, about any such confidential information rendered in the 
course of securing legal representation. Accord Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2) (2002). 
The comment to Rule 1.6 explains the nature and purpose of this guarantee: 
A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the 
absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal 
information relating to the representation.... This contributes to the trust 
that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby 
encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly 
with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. 
Utah Rules of Prof 1 Conduct R. 1.6(a) comment (2006). This principle extends to 
information provided during the initial attorney-client conference. Utah St. Bar Ethics 
Adv. Op. 97-02 (1997). 
The privilege may only be waived by the client. In re Young's Estate, 33 Utah 
382, 94 P. 731, 733 (1908). Once the client waives the privilege, no one else, including 
the attorney, may claim it. See Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, Tf 13, 984 P.2d 980; State v. 
Hoben, 36 Utah 186, 196, 102 P. 1000, 1004 (1909). 
Mr. Bucher violated the "fundamental principle" of attorney-client confidentiality 
when he conceded Mr. Vos's involvement in the shooting. Mr. Vos did not consent to 
this disclosure. Then, with the cat out of the bag, Mr. Bucher "kept insisting and kept 
insisting" that Mr. Vos detail his involvement. (R. 259 at 33.) Mr. Vos's admission 
waived any privilege against revealing this incriminating information. 
Moreover, from the moment of Mr. Vos's statement, which surrendered any 
privilege to keep confidential his statements to Mr. Bucher, Mr. Bucher became a 
potential prosecution witness with direct knowledge of Mr. Vos's involvement. Utah R. 
Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), 804 (a)(1), 804(b)(3). 
C. Mr. Bucher Did Not Conduct an Adequate Investigation Before Insisting that 
Mr. Vos Confess. 
Mr. Bucher's failure to confirm or dispel the detective's misstatements about the 
existence of direct evidence - before insisting that Mr. Vos detail his involvement based 
upon those misstatements - falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
A defense attorney's primary role "is to make the adversarial testing process 
work." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. To make the process work, "counsel has a duty to 
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary." Id. at 691. A reasonable decision not to investigate is 
entitled to a "heavy measure of deference." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Utah 
1993) (quoting Strickland, 446 U.S. at 691). However, if defense counsel "fails to 
adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case, counsel's performance cannot be 
viewed as reasonable." Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1255 (Utah 1993) (citing State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990)). In Utah, the failure to adequately investigate the basic facts 
of a case "cannot be considered a tactical decision." Templin, 805 P.2d at 188. 
Promptly investigating the key facts upon being retained by a defendant is critical: 
"Pretrial investigation, principally because it provides a basis upon which most of the 
defense case must rest, is, perhaps, the most critical stage of a lawyer's preparation." Dill 
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v. State, 484 So.2d 491, 497 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (quoting House v. Balkcom, 725 
F.2d 608, 617-18 (11th Cir.), cert, denied 469 U.S. 870 (1984)). 
In terms especially applicable to the case on review, the ABA has declared: 
Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances 
of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of 
the case and the penalty in the event of conviction. The investigation should 
include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution 
and law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of 
the accused's admissions or statements to defense counsel of facts 
constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty. 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, Duty to Investigate (2d ed. 2005). 
Mr. Bucher resolved to pursue a claim of imperfect self-defense upon hearing Mr. 
Vos's admission of involvement, and the history of prior conflict between Mr. Vos and 
the victim. Mr. Bucher's insistence that Mr. Vos admit his involvement in the shooting 
was based upon the detective's misstatements about the existence of witnesses who could 
identify Mr. Vos. (R. 259 at 10, 22-23.) Mr. Bucher had not reviewed witness 
statements or conducted interviews before insisting that Mr. Vos make a statement. 
Mr. Bucher reached this conclusion a scant five days after being retained. Even 
Mr. Vos's initial refusal to give a statement failed to lessen Mr. Bucher's resolve that Mr. 
Vos provide details capable of proving a manslaughter charge. (R. 259 at 33 (Mr. Bucher 
"kept insisting and kept insisting").) 
Not one witness called by the state at trial identified Mr. Vos as being involved in 
the shooting. Infra, Point 111(A)(2). However, due to Mr. Bucher's unwavering trust in 
the detective's misstatements, Mr. Bucher, and thus Mr. Vos, were blind to the state's 
lack of direct evidence when Mr. Bucher insisted that Mr. Vos make a statement. 
The reasonableness of counsel's decisions regarding necessary investigation "[is] 
usually based, quite properly on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and 
on information supplied by the defendant" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (emphasis 
added). In stark contrast to the foregoing pronouncement, Mr. Bucher's decision not to 
investigate the veracity of the detective's misstatements was unreasonable. He 
consciously chose not to listen to Mr. Vos. There were no pressing time constraints. The 
effort required to obtain and read the witness statements would have been minimal. 
Especially Mr. Vos's initial refusal to give a statement should have persuaded Mr. 
Bucher at least to read the witness statements. 
D. Mr. Bucher Did Not Ensure that Mr. Vos Voluntarily, Knowingly and 
Intelligently Waived His Constitutional Rights before Making a Statement. 
Mr. Vos's so-called waiver of Miranda rights before giving police an 
incriminating statement was not given voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently. Mr. 
Bucher provided deficient representation by failing to ensure that Mr. Vos understood 
those rights before detailing his involvement. 
In Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, the Court declared that the admissibility of 
statements given during custodial interrogation would depend upon whether four 
warnings were given. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000). Those 
warnings are: "a suspect 'has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used 
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that 
if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if 
he so desires."5 Id, (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479). A defendant's right to these 
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warnings is constitutionally based in both the "Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 433. 
A valid waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently given. State v. 
Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985). A defendant may never be presumed to 
understand his Miranda rights based, for example, upon the defendant's prior experience: 
"Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his 
age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than 
speculation." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69; id. at 471-72 ("No amount of circumstantial 
evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice. . . . " ) . 
Even if Mr. Bucher's purported waiver of Mr. Vos's right to remain silent was 
valid,3 it still was insufficient to constitute a valid waiver of the other rights. Especially 
critical is the warning against self-incrimination. The warning against self-incrimination 
constitutes not only information about the privilege to remain silent, but also about the 
consequences of waiving that right: 
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the 
explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in 
court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the 
privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an 
awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real 
understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this 
warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is 
faced with a phase of the adversary system - that he is not in the presence of 
persons acting solely in his interest. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. 
3
 Mr. Bucher's purported waiver of Mr. Vos's right to remain silent was not valid as to 
that right or the other three rights. Infra, Point IV. 
At the evidentiary hearing in the case at bar, the detective (following review of the 
interview transcript to refresh his recollection) testified that Mr. Bucher purported to 
waive only Mr. Vos's right to remain silent: 
Q [by prosecuting attorney]: Now, having had an opportunity to reread the 
transcript, does that refresh your recollection on whether Mr. Bucher said 
anything about rights? 
A [by the detective]: Yes. 
Q: And what do you recall now? 
A: Mr. Bucher advised his clients [sic] of his constitutional rights [sic] to 
remain silent, and they decided to make the statement. 
(R. 259 at 16; accordR. 117, f 9 (the district court found, "Vos was advised by his 
attorney, John Boucher [sic], that he ought to waive his right to remain silent and give a 
statement to Detective Parks"). 
Mr. Vos testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was not advised of his right 
against self-incrimination: 
Q [by defense counsel]: Did he [Mr. Bucher] tell you that you didn't have 
to give a statement? 
A [by Mr. Vos]: He told me that I didn't have to talk about it or about - he 
told me I didn't have to talk about the gun specifically. About the 
statement, he never said that I didn't really have to give one, but I didn't 
want to, and he kept pushing forth that I do give a statement. 
(R. 259 at 34.) 
By waiving his client's right to have the Miranda warnings read before a 
statement was given, Mr. Bucher ignored his fundamental role of ensuring the integrity of 
the adversarial process upon which the criminal justice system depends. See Strickland, 
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466 U.S. at 696. Most importantly, Mr. Bucher deprived Mr. Vos of the right to refuse to 
make a statement - a right Mr. Vos was unknowingly attempting to invoke. 
E. There Was No Strategic or Tactical Justification for Mr. Bucher's 
Uninformed Insistence that Mr. Vos Give a Statement. 
Neither Mr. Bucher's disclosure of confidential information, his exclusion of Mr. 
Vos from the decision-making process, his inadequate investigation, nor the failure to 
inform Mr. Vos about his right against self-incrimination qualifies as a legitimate 
strategic or tactical decision. 
In measuring effectiveness of representation, review courts "will not second-guess 
trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices." State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, f 72, 125 
P.3d 878 (quoting State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah 1993)). Legitimate 
strategic and tactical decisions are entitled to "great deference." Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, *f 
72. Deference, therefore, is accorded only for decisions that are "legitimate." 
Before addressing Mr. Bucher's stated reasons for his decision that Mr. Vos detail 
his involvement in the shooting, three imperatives render this decision illegitimate per se. 
First, the failure to investigate the basic facts of a case is never legitimate: 
If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case . . . 
counsel's performance cannot fall within the "wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance." This is because a decision not to investigate cannot 
be considered a tactical decision. 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 (footnote omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). 
Second, no matter the factual context, excluding a client from the decision-making 
process when no time constraints exist and confessing a client to a crime without his 
knowledge or consent is never "legitimate." See supra, Point 1(A), (B), (C). 
Third, while advising a client to detail to police his or her involvement in a crime 
may constitute a legitimate decision, failing even to inform a client of his right against 
self-incrimination, failing to require police to provide such a warning, and then insisting 
that the client incriminate himself against his will, can never be legitimate. See supra, 
Point 1(D). 
These decisions violate plain standards, laws, and constitutional protections as 
detailed above in Sections A through D. No justification for their violation exists. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Bucher gave three reasons for insisting that Mr. 
Vos give a statement: (1) to establish a claim of imperfect self-defense; (2) to secure a 
plea bargain; and (3) to secure a reduction in bail so Mr. Vos might be released from jail 
"and get out of town for a while because things were hot." (R. 259 at 25.) Each reason is 
addressed below. 
1. Establishing an imperfect self-defense claim. Mr. Vos was not required to 
announce his trial strategy beforehand. Admitting facts to establish a claim of imperfect 
self-defense months before trial was not required. Little tactical advantage lies in 
detailing the defense theory before discovery, months before trial. Absolutely no 
advantage lies where the admissions are disclosed just five days after the defendant's 
surrender, without garnering anything of value in exchange, and before demanding to see 
the prosecutor's evidence. 
2. Securing a plea bargain. Securing a plea bargain may be a legitimate goal. 
However, giving an incriminating statement without even discussing the possibility of 
leniency a mere five days after the defendant's surrender and before conducting 
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discovery certainly is not a legitimate decision. Mason v. Balcorn, 531 F.2d 717, 724-25 
(5th Cir. 1976) (failure to seek plea bargain is relevant to identifying ineffective 
assistance); United States v. Mohammad, 999 F.Supp. 1198, 1200 (N.D. 111. 1998) (lack 
of preparation evidenced by failure to seek plea bargain constitutes ineffective assistance, 
whether government would have accepted guilty plea is irrelevant) (citing Dillon v. 
Duckworth, 751 F.2d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 1984)). Owing to his inadequate preparation, 
Mr. Bucher handed the prosecution the most incriminating evidence in exchange for 
nothing - a conclusion buttressed by Mr. Vos's subsequent conviction for murder. 
3. Securing a bail reduction to allow Mr. Vos to leave town. It is simply 
inconceivable that the district court would lower bail so an unemployed, unmarried male 
facing murder charges and stuck dead center between rival gangs "could get out of town 
for a while" - especially after detailing his own involvement (R. 259 at 25.) Mr. 
Bucher's decisions based upon this flight of fancy may not be considered legitimate trial 
strategy. 
POINT II: PREJUDICE FROM THE DEFICIENT REPRESENTATION 
MAY BE PRESUMED. 
Prejudice necessary to perfect an ineffective assistance claim on appeal may be 
presumed whenever defense counsel fails to preserve the adversarial process: 
In every case the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong 
presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is 
unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system 
counts on to produce just results. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. Prejudice is presumed where (1) defense counsel has an 
actual conflict of interest, or (2) the defendant is constructively denied assistance of 
counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. This is so, in part, because examining choices and 
potential trial strategy in the face of, for example, counsel's conflict of interest, would be 
"'virtually impossible' and would require 'unguided speculation.'" Davis v. State, 596 
F.2d 1214, 1223 (5th Cir. 1979) {vacated as moot, Alabama v. Davis, 446 U.S. 903 
(1980)) (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978)). 
Utah appellate courts may presume prejudice not only upon a showing of conflict 
of interest or constructive denial of counsel, but also "where it is 'unnecessary and ill-
advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual prejudice.'" State v. Arguelles, 
921 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah 1996) (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523 n.6 (Utah 
1994) (quoting State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 859 (Utah 1992))). 
Mr. Bucher's conflict of interest and the constructive denial of counsel are 
addressed in Sections A and B. Section C addresses this court's inherent authority to 
presume prejudice under other circumstances. 
A, Mr. Bucher Had an Actual Conflict of Interest. 
No more compelling evidence of an attorney's antagonism to a client's interests 
could exist than the attorney confessing his client at least to manslaughter without the 
client's permission, and effectively preventing the client from invoking the right against 
self-incrimination while, at the same time, insisting the client detail his involvement 
based upon a detective's uncorroborated misstatements. 
When defense counsel discloses his client's guilt 
[w]ithout consultation, the attorney/client relationship is damaged, and the 
result may be an irreparable conflict of interest that could result in a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. We believe that a complete concession of 
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guilt is a serious strategic decision that must only be made after consulting 
with the client and after receiving the client's consent or acquiescence. 
Jackson v. State, 41 P.3d 395, 400 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001). 
Serving up a client's inculpatory statement based upon a detective's misstatements 
while restricting the client from invoking self-incrimination rights, places the attorney in 
direct opposition to the client's legitimate interests: 
To be effective, an attorney "must play the role of an active advocate, rather 
than a mere friend of the court." Evitts v. Lueey, 469 U.S. 387, 394, 105 
S.Ct. 830, 835, 83 LJEd.2d 821 (1985). Unless an attorney represents the 
interests of a client with zeal and loyalty, the adversarial system of justice 
cannot operate. [State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1994) {Holland 
II)] (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 
2045-46, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-
26, 68 S.Ct. 316, 324, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948) (plurality opinion)). At the very 
least, this duty of loyalty requires attorneys to refrain from acting as an 
advocate against their clients, even in a matter unrelated to the case for 
which the attorney has been retained. See HollandII, 876 P.2d at 359-60. 
State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 435-36 (Utah 1996). 
In State v. Jones, 923 P.2d 560 (Mont. 1996), defense counsel negotiated a plea 
agreement. When the defendant rejected the agreement and may have indicated a desire 
to testify falsely, counsel moved to withdraw. Id. at 563. In so doing, counsel told the 
trial court that the defendant's rejection of the agreement and desire to go to trial was 
ccrepugnant or imprudent." Id. at 562. Counsel then detailed the defendant's role in the 
charged offense, thus disclosing to the court the substance of the defendant's admissions 
previously made only to counsel. Id. The court denied counsel's motion to withdraw 
upon the defendant's statement that he did not intend to testify. Id. 
The Court in Jones acknowledged a criminal defendant's constitutional rights to 
"counsel of reasonable competence," and "counsel's undivided loyalty." Id., 923 P.2d at 
562 (citing State v. Christenson, 820 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Mont. 1991)). Representation by 
competent and loyal counsel constitutes a "jurisdictional prerequisite to depriving a 
person of his or her liberty." Jones, 923 P.2d at 568 (quoting Frazer v. United States 18 
F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1994)). With regard to counsel's duty of loyalty, the Jones Court 
observed, "the Sixth Amendment right to counsel contemplates the assistance of an 
attorney devoted 'solely to the interests of his client.'" Id. at 562 (quoting Frazer, 18 
F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 725-26)). The Jones 
Court found that a conflict of interest develops when the attorney abandons the duty of 
loyalty owed to the client and effectively becomes an ally of the prosecution: 
An attorney who abandons his or her duty of loyalty may create a conflict of 
interest. Frazer, 18 F.3d at 782. A defense attorney who essentially joins 
the prosecution's efforts in obtaining a conviction and acts on a belief that 
the defendant should be convicted "suffers from an obvious conflict of 
interest." Frazer, 18 F.3d at 782 (citation omitted). Such and attorney 
"'fail[s] to function in any meaningful sense as the Government's 
adversary.'" Frazer, 18 F.3d at 782 (quoting United States v. Swanson, (9th 
Cir. 1991), 943 F.2d 1070, 1074). 
While defense counsel in a criminal case assumes a dual role as a 
"zealous advocate" and as an "officer of the court," neither role 
would countenance disclosure to the Court of counsel's private 
conjectures about the guilt or innocence of his client. It is the role 
of the judge or jury to determine the facts, not that of the attorney. 
Jones, 923 P.2d at 566 (quoting United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 
122 (3d Cir. 1977)). 
Thus to establish an actual conflict of interest, Mr. Bucher must have pursued 
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interests "to the detriment" of his client. See State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (quoting State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997)). 
Like the attorney in Jones, Mr. Bucher disregarded Mr. Vos's "paramount, and 
unqualified" right to be involved in substantive decisions such as whether to enter a plea, 
waive a trial by jury or testify at trial. See Jones, 923 P.2d at 566. Mr. Bucher breached 
the duties of confidentiality and loyalty by conceding the key element of murder without 
Mr. Vos's permission - in an attempt, he concedes, to secure a conviction of 
manslaughter. Mr. Bucher made a mockery of these duties by insisting Mr. Vos confess 
at the same time he restricted Mr. Vos from invoking his right against self-incrimination. 
Mr. Bucher "abandoned his adversarial role," see id. at 567, and became the 
prosecution's best friend. 
Mr. Bucher's disclosure to the detective had a ripple effect upon other 
fundamental rights over which Mr. Vos possessed decision-making authority. See People 
v. DiNicolantonio, 532 N.Y.S.2d 257, 261-62, 140 A.D.2d 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) 
(despite convincing evidence of guilt, the conviction must be reversed because improper 
admission of confession altered entire defense strategy). Mr. Bucher exposed Mr. Vos to 
obstruction of justice charges by telling the detective, without consulting Mr. Vos, that 
the weapon used in the shooting had been destroyed. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
306(l)(c) (Supp. 2005). By insisting that Mr. Vos admit his involvement, Mr. Bucher 
gave up Mr. Vos's right to confront adverse witnesses as to whether they could identify 
Mr. Vos, because that issue became irrelevant. Mr. Bucher effectively surrendered Mr. 
Vos's right to remain silent by himself detailing Mr. Vos's involvement, while insisting 
that Mr. Vos make a statement and restricting Mr. Vos's right against self-incrimination. 
He surrendered Mr. Vos's right not to testify at trial by locking Mr. Vos into a self-
defense claim for which only Mr. Vos could offer the most salient evidence. 
B. Mr. Vos Was Constructively Denied the Assistance of Counsel. 
Having an attorney who concedes his client's involvement in a crime to a 
detective without the client's permission, who fails to perform minimal discovery before 
making significant decisions, who refuses to allow his client a say in such decisions, who 
effectively prohibits his client from invoking self-incrimination protections, and who 
insists the client admit to a key element of homicide when the prosecution has no direct 
evidence thereof, is equivalent to having no attorney at all. 
"[I]f counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful 
adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes 
the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 
648, 659 (1984) (argued and decided the same days as Strickland). 
The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the 
accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of 
meaningful adversarial testing. When a true adversarial criminal trial has 
been conducted - even if defense counsel may have made demonstrable 
errors - the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has 
occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between 
adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated. 
Id, 466 U.S. at 656-57. 
Examination of counsel's actual performance is unnecessary where "surrounding 
circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662. 
Specific errors and omissions may be sufficient in this regard. Id. at 657 n.20. The key is 
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whether there has been a breakdown in the adversarial process. Id. at 656-57 & n.21. 
For example, where no attempt to investigate is made or allowed, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has held the "defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense. 
To decide otherwise, would simply be to ignore actualities." Id at 661 n.27 (quoting 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932)). Constructive denial of counsel at a critical 
stage does not turn upon whether the denial resulted from counsel's decisions, or was 
caused by external forces. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662 n.31. 
In this case, Mr. Bucher conceded the key element of the murder charge on which 
his client was subsequently convicted, without consulting with his client, and without any 
testing whatsoever of the detective's misstatements or the prosecution's evidence. Based 
upon the same inadequate investigation, he insisted that his client give a statement, at the 
same time he restricted his client's opportunity to invoke self-incrimination rights. Mr. 
Vos received absolutely nothing of value in return. Mr. Bucher accepted without 
question the detective's misstatements. He did not so much as read the witness 
statements before insisting that his client detail his involvement. 
Unlike the facts of Powell and Cronic, supra, in which trial courts' refusal to grant 
defense counsel additional time to prepare for trial was at issue, the complete failure to 
investigate, and the harm flowing therefrom, were of Mr. Bucher's making. There were 
no external constraints forcing Mr. Bucher to act so imprudently. Charges, after all, had 
only been filed the day before. (R. 1.) 
The forgoing illustrates an absence of "confrontation between adversaries." See 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 656-57. Having counsel who accepts as gospel everything a detective 
says some six days after the crime, upon which the most important and irreversible 
strategic decisions are made, without any legitimate advantage gained thereby, is akin to 
having no counsel at all. So is representation by an attorney who effectively prohibits 
his client from invoking his self-incrimination rights. 
C. This Court May Presume Prejudice Independent of Conflict of Interest and 
Denial of Counsel. 
Other reasons taken alone or combined with the conflict of interest and denial of 
counsel argue for a presumption of prejudice. Such reasons include a fundamentally 
unfair process, and doubt that the defendant received a fair trial: 
Although a defendant may show that he or she was denied effective 
assistance of counsel by satisfying both prongs of the Strickland test, the 
Supreme Court has emphasized that the principles set out in Strickland "do 
not establish mechanical rules," [Strickland 466 U.S. at 696]. Instead, these 
principles "are guides to the ultimate focus upon the fundamental fairness of 
the proceeding challenged," [State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 
1986)]; accord Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, because 
"[t]he purpose of the inquiry is simply to insure that defendant receives a 
fair trial," Frame, 723 P.2d at 405; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 
S.Ct. at 2065 (purpose of effective assistance guarantee is "to ensure that 
criminal defendants receive a fair trial"). 
Classon, 935 P.2d at 533. Another reason for presuming prejudice lies where a fact-
intensive investigation is "unnecessary and ill-advised." Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 442 
(quoting Parsons, 871 P.2d at 523 n.6 (quoting Brown, 853 P.2d at 859)). In addition, 
the requirement to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a constitutional violation 
incurred through counsel's ineffectiveness is harmless, see Gallegos, 967 P.2d at 980-81, 
effectively presumes prejudice by shifting the burden of proof to those who urge the 
verdict's affirmance. 
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In this case, the circumstances surrounding the admissions were fundamentally 
unfair; scrutinizing the facts for evidence of prejudice is unnecessary and ill-advised. 
This stems in large part from the fact that it is "impossible to know what credit and 
weight the jury gave to the confession." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 292 
(1991) (White, J., dissenting). 
Mr. Bucher confessed his client's guilt to manslaughter without his client's 
permission. He insisted that his client detail his involvement based upon a detective's 
uncorroborated misstatements - at the same time he restricted his client's ability to 
invoke his right against self-incrimination. These decisions provided the prosecution 
with the only direct evidence of Mr. Vos's involvement, and are inexorably tied to all 
decisions that followed. After the trial court's denial of Mr. Vos's motion to suppress the 
statement, subsequent defense counsel's hands were tied. Any currency with which to 
leverage a favorable plea bargain was squandered. At trial, the prosecution used the 
statement not only to support the murder charge, but also to undermine all self-defense 
theories. Infra, Point III(A). Consider also the constitutional rights surrendered or 
rendered meaningless by Mr. Bucher's decisions absent Mr. Vos's input. Supra, Point 
11(A). 
The process leading up to Mr. Vos's conviction was fundamentally unfair. 
Further factual scrutiny is unnecessary and ill advised. 
POINT III: MR. VOS'S DEFENSE WAS PREJUDICED BY MR. 
BUCHER'S DEFICIENT REPRESENTATION. 
Alternative to presuming prejudice, Mr. Vos suffered actual prejudice as a result 
of Mr. Bucher's deficient representation. 
Generally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires evidence that the 
defendant "was prejudiced by the deficient performance." Brandley, 972 P.2d at 85 
(quoting State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 355 (Utah 1996)). Prejudice is established when, 
"but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome 
of the trial would have been different." Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ^ f 23 (quoting Wickham, 
2002UT72,^f 19). 
The actual prejudice flowing from Mr. Vos's ill-advised statement to police, and 
from Mr. Bucher's failure to investigate, are addressed below in Sections A and B. 
A. The Prosecution Made Full Use of the Statements to Prove the Murder 
Charge and to Undermine any Claim of Self-Defense. 
One cannot minimize the impact a defendant's confession has upon a jury: 
A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, "the defendant's own 
confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can 
be admitted against him. . . . [T]he admissions of a defendant come from 
the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of 
information about his past conduct. Certainly, confessions have profound 
impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to 
put them out of mind even if told to do so." 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 298 (alterations in original) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 
391 U.S. 123, 139-40 (1968) (White, J. dissenting)); id at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in the judgment) ("If the jury believes that a defendant has admitted the crime, it 
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doubtless will be tempted to rest its decision on that evidence alone, without careful 
consideration of the other evidence in the case"). 
Evidence of prejudice includes (1) the prosecution's opposition to Mr. Vos's 
motion to suppress, (2) its use of the statement to prove homicide, and (3) its use of the 
statement to undermine any claim of self-defense. Each is addressed below. 
1. Opposing the Motion to Suppress. Mr. Vos filed a memorandum opposing 
the motion to suppress. (R. 69-75.) The prosecution opposed the motion at the 
subsequent evidentiary hearing. {See R. 259.) The reason the prosecution opposed the 
motion to suppress is obvious: Mr. Vos's statement was highly incriminating; it 
provided the only direct evidence at trial of Mr. Vos's involvement. This is confirmed 
by the prosecution's use of the statement at trial to prove homicide and undermine a 
claim of self-defense {infra, Sec. 2 and 3). 
2. Using the statement to prove homicide. Through Det. Park's testimony, the 
prosecution heavily relied upon Mr. Vos's statement to support the homicide charge. 
The detective testified at trial that Mr. Vos admitted his involvement in the shooting: 
Q [by prosecutor]: Did Mr. Vos indicate or did he admit to you that he had 
in fact shot Jeffrey Maestas? 
A [by Det. Parks]: Yes, he did. 
(R. 260 at 93.) Such an admission in a murder trial is nothing if not prejudicial. 
The detective also testified at trial that Mr. Bucher expressly forbade the detective 
from asking about the murder weapon during the jaiihouse interrogation. (R. 260 at 93.) 
When asked, "Have you ever recovered the gun that Mr. Vos said he had at the time of 
the shooting?" the detective answered, "No." Id. No imagination is required to surmise 
what the jury concluded from this admission coming from the defendant's own lawyer. 
The actual prejudice flowing from the statement is magnified by the prosecution's 
failure to call a single witness able to provide direct evidence of Mr. Vos's involvement 
in the shooting. As already noted, the witnesses to the shooting could not identify Mr. 
Vos.4 The person who subsequently picked up Mr. Vos near the scene of the shooting 
did not appear to testify at trial despite being subpoenaed to do so. (R. 260 at 123-24.) 
No weapon was or could have been discovered to link Mr. Vos to the shooting. (See R. 
259 at 10, 29.) Without Mr. Bucher's and Mr. Vos's statements, the prosecution's best 
trial evidence of Mr. Vos's involvement was the former football coach's testimony that 
he saw Mr. Vos a block away from the crime scene within several minutes of its 
occurrence. (R. 260 at 50-51.) This, however, was also very near Mr. Vos's residence. 
(See R. 260 at 86, 160.) Absent Mr. Bucher's and Mr. Vos's highly incriminating 
admissions, there exists a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. 
3. Using the statement to undermine the self-defense claim. The detective 
also testified to facts at trial only available from Mr. Vos's statement that prejudiced Mr. 
Vos's self-defense claim. 
For example, the detective recounted Mr. Vos's statement that even after Mr. Vos 
had emptied the revolver, he continued pulling the trigger. (R. 260 at 94.) But for Mr. 
4
 Monique Vos and Alicia Arellano were called at trial by Mr. Vos's attorney to support 
his self-defense claim. (See R. 260 at 132-41, 157-60.) Each mentioned that Mr. Vos 
revealed his involvement to them. (R. 260 at 141-42, 161.) But for the self-defense 
claim, which was required pursuant to the pretrial admissions, neither witness would have 
been called, and the admissions would not have reached the jury. 
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Vos's statement, this would never have reached the jury. In closing argument, the 
prosecution mocked Mr. Vos's attempt to explain this admission. (R. 261 at 255-56.) 
The detective also testified to prejudicial omissions from Mr. Vos's statement. 
Referencing Mr. Vos's statement, the detective noted Mr. Vos's failure to indicate 
whether the victim's hands were hidden when he approached Mr. Vos, and Mr. Vos's 
failure to indicate whether he thought he saw a weapon in the victim's hands. (R. 260 at 
95.) 
Finally, the detective was recalled by the prosecution in rebuttal. A defense 
witness had just testified about incidents relevant to Mr. Vos's fear that the victim 
intended to cause Mr. Vos serious physical harm. For example, the witness described a 
conversation in which the victim showed the witness guns and threatened to kill Mr. Vos 
if he discovered Mr. Vos played a role in a prior incident. (R. 261 at 225.) The witness 
recounted how the victim admitted shooting at Mr. Vos's home in an incident that 
occurred just prior to the shooting at issue herein. (R. 261 at 226.) The defense witness 
testified that he informed Mr. Vos of these occurrences. (R. 261 at 226-27.) In rebuttal, 
the detective noted that Mr. Vos did not mention this defense witness during his 
jailhouse interrogation. The prosecution relied upon this omission to undermine the 
defense witness's credibility and, with it, evidence critical to establishing Mr. Vos's 
reasonable fear of great bodily harm. (R. 261 at 232-33.) 
B. Mr. Bucher's Inadequate Investigation Prejudiced Mr. Vos. 
Mr. Bucher's failure to confirm or dispel the detective's misstatements about 
eyewitnesses before conceding to police Mr. Vos's involvement, and before insisting 
that Mr. Vos give a statement, prejudiced Mr. Vos. 
Adequate investigation is central to defense counsel's primary role of maintaining 
the integrity of the adversarial process. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 691. A failure to 
adequately investigate the basic facts of a case raises a presumption of unreasonableness. 
Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1255 (citing Templin, 805 P.2d at 188). Especially crucial is pretrial 
investigation, because it supplies the foundation upon which all other substantive and 
strategic decisions are made. Dill, 484 So.2d at 497 (quoting House, 725 F.2d at 617-18). 
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 emphasize the critical need for prompt 
and thorough investigation, even where the accused admits guilt. 
A defendant cannot meet Strickland's prejudice prong merely by identifying 
something defense counsel should have investigated. Rather, the defendant "'must 
demonstrate a reasonable probability that further investigation would have yielded 
sufficient information to alter the outcome' of [the] trial." State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 
808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523-24 (Utah), 
rehearing denied, cert, denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994)). 
Had Mr. Bucher just read the witness's statements, he would have discovered that 
no prosecution witness could tie Mr. Vos to the shooting. He would have discovered that 
the only evidence tying Mr. Vos to the shooting was circumstantial and speculative. He 
would have learned that the detective was greatly exaggerating the existence of 
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inculpatory evidence. {Contrast R. 259 at 27-28.) He would not have told Mr. Vos that 
there were eyewitnesses who could identify Mr. Vos even as he insisted that Mr. Vos 
give a statement. {Contrast R. 259 at 27-28, 33-34.) He would certainly have realized 
that the shooter's identity was at issue. {Contrast R. 259 at 19, 23.) He would not have 
insisted that Mr. Vos concede his involvement over Mr. Vos's objections.5 
Had Mr. Vos not made the statement, subsequent defense counsel would not have 
been locked into asserting self-defense, or urging conviction on the lesser included 
charge of manslaughter. Subsequent defense counsel's attempt to suppress the statement 
is clear evidence of counsel's intent to pursue other options. Moreover, even if trial 
counsel pursued a self-defense claim at trial, absent the detective's testimony from Mr. 
Vos's statement, there still exists a reasonable probability that the self-defense or 
manslaughter strategies would have succeeded. At the very least, had Mr. Vos not given 
the statement, his knowledge about the incident could have been leveraged in any 
subsequent plea negotiations initiated pursuant to the prosecution's lack of direct 
evidence. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED MR. VOS'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE STATEMENT. 
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Vos's motion to suppress his statement to 
police. (The court's Findings and Conclusions are attached as Addendum C.) There is 
5
 Even if Mr. Bucher continued insisting that Mr, Vos give a statement despite the 
absence of eyewitnesses, at least Mr. Vos would have had the benefit of the most 
rudimentary of information upon which to decide whether to accept the advice. 
no evidence to support several factual findings. The so-called waiver of Miranda rights 
was not given voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently; thus the court's legal conclusions 
to the contrary are incorrect. The mere presence of defense counsel does not cure the 
detective's failure to read Mr. Vos his rights; thus, again, the court's legal conclusions to 
the contrary are incorrect. It cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the court's 
failure to suppress the statement was harmless. These points are addressed below in 
Sections A through D. 
A. Several Findings of Fact are Clearly Erroneous. 
Factual findings contained in paragraphs 5, 11 and 14 (R. 116-17) find no support 
in the record and are clearly erroneous. A trial court's findings of fact on a motion to 
suppress are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Miller, 2004 UT App 445, <j 5. 
A finding not supported by evidence in the record is clearly erroneous. See Cowley, 2005 
UT App 518,^46. 
6
 Several "findings," which obviously are legal conclusions, are not addressed herein. 
Those so-called findings are set forth in paragraphs 10, 12 and 13. (R. 117.) "The labels 
attached to findings of fact or conclusions of law are not determinative." Zions First Nat. 
Bank N.A. v. National American Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988). A 
conclusion incorrectly labeled a finding is treated as a conclusion and reviewed for 
correctness. Id. A finding is an observation directly derived from evidence, while a 
conclusion is the application of a legal standard to a specific set of facts: "The appellate 
courts of this State have held that findings of fact 'must show that the court's judgment or 
decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence.'" Cowley v. Porter, 
2005 UT App 518, Tf 46, 127 P.3d 1224 (quoting Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22,^ j 24, 
112 P.3d 495 (quotations and citation omitted)). Paragraphs 10, 12 and 13 apply legal 
principles common to standard Miranda analysis such as "knowingly," "voluntarily," 
"adequate protection device," and "not the product of compulsion." (R. 117.) They 
effectively mimic the conclusions set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2. (R. 118.) This brief, 
therefore, addresses those findings incorrectly labeled as conclusions only as they relate 
to actual conclusions 1 and 2. (Id.) 
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Paragraph 5 finds that the detective read Mr. Vos the Miranda warnings at the 
time of his surrender. (R. 116.) The prosecution "bears a heavy burden" to prove 
Miranda warnings were given and understood. See State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 443 
(Utah 1986). The only evidence in the record as to whether Mr. Vos received the 
Miranda warnings at that time is testimony from the evidentiary hearing. When asked 
whether any conversation between Mr. Vos and the detective occurred at the time of Mr. 
Vos's surrender, the detective testified, "No, not a Miranda *d statement. Of course I 
talked to him, but there was no questioning done at that time." (R. 259 at 7.) The 
evidence offers nothing from which the prosecution can sustain its heavy burden of 
proving the Miranda warnings were given and understood. 
Paragraph 11 finds that Mr. Vos's inculpatory statements "were made as part of 
the cogent and joint strategy of Vos and his attorney...." (R. 117.) As detailed supra, 
Points I through III, only legitimate decisions are entitled such deference. Mr. Bucher's 
concession without Mr. Vos's permission that Mr. Vos was guilty of manslaughter was 
illegitimate because it was rendered without Mr. Vos's permission. Mr. Bucher's 
insistence that Mr. Vos make a statement was illegitimate because it was based upon the 
detective's uncorroborated misstatements, without the benefit of even the most 
superficial factual investigation. Mr. Vos's statement itself is illegitimate because it was 
given absent a self-incrimination warning. Even ignoring the ethical, statutory and 
constitutional violations leading up to it, Mr. Bucher's rationale for insisting that Mr. Vos 
make a statement (to establish a self-defense claim, obtain a plea bargain, and secure a 
bail reduction so Mr. Vos could flee Salt Lake County) are fanciful. Supra, Point 1(E). 
Finally, the record is clear that this so-called strategy was Mr. Bucher's, not Mr. Vos's -
Mr. Bucher did not even ensure that Mr. Vos understood his constitutional right against 
self-incrimination. 
Paragraph 14 finds that at the time of the statement, "Mr. Bucher specifically 
ensured that Vos' Miranda rights were waived, and gave Vos the opportunity to change 
his mind about discussing the case with Detective Parks." (R. 117.) As explained in the 
section immediately following, there exists no legal authority that an attorney may waive 
Miranda rights on behalf of his client, let alone waive even their reading. Further, the 
record is clear that Mr. Bucher purported to waive only Mr. Vos's right to remain silent, 
while not allowing the detective to read the self-incrimination warning to Mr. Vos, or 
himself explaining that right to Mr. Vos. Again, the record lends no support in fact or 
law to the state's heavy burden of establishing that Mr. Vos received and validly waived 
all four Miranda rights. 
B. No Voluntary, Knowing or Intelligent Waiver of Miranda Rights Occurred, 
In Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, the Court declared that the admissibility of 
statements given during custodial interrogation would depend upon whether four 
warnings were given. Dicker son at 435. 
A waiver sufficient to permit admission of statements given during custodial 
interrogation must be shown to have been voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Moore, 
697 P.2d at 236. 
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1. Mr. Vos's waiver was not voluntary. The trial court erred in finding the 
prosecution carried its heavy burden to prove Mr. Vos received all four warnings and 
voluntarily waived the corresponding rights. 
An examination of circumstances to determine the voluntariness of a statement 
given during custodial interrogation, absent the Miranda warnings, is not sufficient. 
Dicker son, 530 U.S. at 444 (invalidating federal statute that allowed a totality of the 
circumstances test to determine voluntariness where warnings were not given). The 
warnings constitute a bright line to establish voluntariness. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69. 
The prosecution "bears a heavy burden to establish not only that defendant 
understood his constitutional rights, but that he voluntarily elected to waive them." State 
v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1986). The United State Supreme Court "has always 
set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458 ... (1938), and we reassert these standards as applied to incustody 
interrogation." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. Significantly, "'the defendant is given the 
benefit of every reasonable presumption against such a waiver.'" State v. Streeter, 900 
P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Fulton, 742 
P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah 1987), cert, denied 484 U.S. 1044 (1988)). 
At the custodial interrogation at issue herein, Mr. Vos initially refused to talk to 
the detective, and the detective left the room. (R. 259 at 26, 33.) Nothing in evidence 
suggests that Mr. Vos received the four warnings before this initial refusal to give a 
statement, nor rebuts the presumption against a subsequent waiver. 
Mr. Vos and Mr. Bucher then discussed alone how to proceed. Mr. Bucher "kept 
insisting and kept insisting" that Mr. Vos give a statement. (R. 259 at 33.) Mr. Bucher 
"kept pushing" Mr. Vos to give a statement. (R. 259 at 34.) When asked at the 
evidentiary hearing on Mr. Vos's motion to suppress to recount what they discussed 
outside the detective's presence, Mr. Bucher did not so much as hint that he'd advised 
Mr. Vos of all four Miranda warnings, in particular the self-incrimination warning. (See 
R. 259 at 26-28.) When Mr. Vos was asked at the evidentiary hearing what was 
discussed during the private consultation with Mr. Bucher, Mr, Vos testified he was not 
advised of his right not to give a statement: 
[Mr. Bucher] told me that I didn't have to talk about it or about - he told me 
I didn't have to talk about the gun specifically. About the statement, he 
never said that I didn't really have to give one, but I didn't want to, and he 
kept pushing forth that I do give a statement. 
(R. 259 at 34.) 
Following his review of the actual interrogation transcript at the evidentiary 
hearing, the detective testified that Mr. Bucher advised Mr. Vos only of his right to 
remain silent, and that Mr. Bucher purported to waive only that right on Mr. Vos's 
behalf. (A* at 16; R. 117, If 9.) 
The four warnings were not read to Mr. Vos on the record. Never once did Mr. 
Vos say he understood or waived all four rights. The detective conceded that Mr. Vos 
was advised of his right to remain silent - only. (R. 259 at 16.) The evidence does not 
support any reasonable inference that Mr. Vos was warned about his right against self-
incrimination, let alone that he voluntarily waived that right, (Id. at 16, 34; R. 117 U 9 
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(court finds only that Mr. Bucher advised Mr. Vos that he "ought to waive his right to 
remain silent and give a statement to Detective Parks").) 
When "every reasonable presumption against" a waiver of all four rights is 
accorded Mr. Vos, see Streeter, 900 P.2d at 1101, inescapable becomes the conclusion 
that Mr. Vos did not voluntarily waive all four Miranda rights because he never received 
them. Mr. Vos cannot be assumed to have understood and voluntarily waived rights of 
which he was never informed. The prosecution has not met its "heavy burden to establish 
not only that defendant understood his constitutional rights, but that he voluntarily 
elected to waive them." See Velarde, 734 P.2d at 443. Any finding that Mr. Vos 
voluntarily waived all four Miranda rights is clearly erroneous, and any conclusion based 
thereon incorrect. 
2. Mr. Vos's waiver was not knowingly and intelligently given. The knowing 
and intelligent requirements for determining a waiver's validity are sometimes evaluated 
with, and not separately from, voluntariness. Streeter, 900 P.2d at 1101 n.6. They 
should, however, be examined separately since a statement from custodial interrogation 
that was not knowingly or intelligently given must be suppressed even if it was 
voluntarily made by a defendant aware of his rights - and even where it permits "a guilty 
defendant [to] go free as a result." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444. 
Determining whether a waiver of rights was knowingly and intelligently made 
may take into account the totality of the circumstances. State v. Hilfiker, 868 P.2d 826, 
831 (Utah Ct.App. 1994)7 
Nothing in the record, especially regarding self-incrimination, suggests that Mr. 
Vos knew about his rights, understood their full significance, or was informed of his right 
to refuse their waiver. The record establishes merely that Mr. Bucher desperately wanted 
to waive Mr. Vos's right to remain silent. He insisted that Mr. Vos give a statement 
without warning about self-incrimination. No knowing waiver of rights occurred. 
Nor was the purported waiver intelligently given. Mr. Vos was told by his 
attorney that there was more than one eyewitness who could identify him as being 
involved in the shooting. This information was false, and Mr. Bucher most certainly 
could and should have verified the information before insisting that Mr. Vos give an 
incriminating statement. Because Mr. Vos was grossly misled by his attorney as to the 
evidence against him, the prosecution cannot meet its burden of proving that Mr. Vos 
intelligently waived his rights before giving police the statement. 
C. The Presence of Counsel Does Not Cure a Failure to Give Miranda Warnings 
or to Secure a Valid Waiver of Miranda Rights. 
The presence of counsel does not cure a failure to inform a defendant of his 
Miranda rights or to secure a valid waiver thereof. To hold otherwise would effectively 
7
 A similar "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" analysis is applied to the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. In State v. Pedockie, the Court held that whether a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of counsel occurred must be examined separate from the issue of 
voluntariness and, unlike voluntariness, may be implied from evidence in the record. 
2006 UT 28, Ifij 29, 50, - P.3d --. 
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imply a waiver of the rights to remain silent and against self-incrimination upon the 
exercise of the right to have counsel present. 
In State v. DeWeese, counsel was onsite where the defendant took a polygraph test 
without first receiving the Miranda warnings. 582 S.E.2d 786, 795 (W.Va. 2003). The 
Court first examined whether the presence of counsel "obviated the need for giving 
Miranda warnings." Id. The Court considered Miranda, 384 U.S. at 496-72 (a self-
incrimination warning must accompany warning of the right to remain silent, "[T]his 
warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial 
evidence will suffice to stand in its stead"). DeWeese, 582 S.E.2d at 795. It observed 
that "we have found no decision wherein a court has ruled that a defendant forfeits 
his/her right to be informed of the privilege against self-incrimination merely because 
he/she has exercised the right to have counsel present at an interrogation." Id. It held 
that prior to examining a defendant, "the police must inform the defendant of his 
Miranda rights even though defense counsel is present in the room with the defendant... 
." Id. at 796. Accord State v. Joseph, 128 P.3d 795, 810-11 (Haw.), reh'g denied 128 
P.3d 891 (2006) (the right against self-incrimination is personal; Miranda rights, 
therefore, "cannot be deemed waived simply because an attorney is present during 
interrogation"). 
In this case, Mr. Bucher purported to waive only Mr. Vos's right to remain silent. 
(R. 259 at 16.) The detective did not ask Mr. Bucher whether he had discussed the 
Miranda warnings with Mr. Vos. (Id. at 13.) Rather, the detective assumed the presence 
of counsel obviated the need for Miranda warnings. (Id. (when asked why he did not 
read Mr. Vos the Miranda warnings, the detective testified, "His attorney was present and 
represented him on that matter5').) Mr. Vos did not waive his personal right against self-
incrimination by having counsel present during the interrogation. Therefore, there was 
no valid waiver of his personal right against self-incrimination. 
A related issue addressed by the Court in DeWeese was whether a defendant may 
validly waive the actual reading of the Miranda warnings. 582 S.E.2d at 796. The Court 
observed that in all cases where a valid Miranda waiver was found, the waiver followed 
the actual reading of the Miranda warnings. Id. Such a result is now compelled by the 
Court's decision in Dicker son, 530 U.S. at 444 (invalidating federal statute that allowed a 
totality of the circumstances test to determine voluntariness where warnings were not 
given). The DeWeese Court observed that "after an exhaustive search, we have found no 
other court that has ruled that a defendant may waive the actual reading of Miranda 
warnings." 582 S.E.2d at 796. Acknowledging that "Miranda recognizes a waiver only 
of rights to which a defendant has been informed," id, the Court concluded: 
[A] defendant cannot, as a matter of law, waive the reading of the Miranda 
warnings. To the extent that the trial court found that defense counsel 
waived Mr. DeWeese's right to have Miranda warnings given to him, this 
finding was error. The right to have Miranda warnings given simply cannot 
be waived. 
Id. at 797. 
In this case, no valid waiver of Miranda rights may be found where Mr. Bucher 
waived the actual reading of the rights to Mr. Vos. The failure to inform Mr. Vos of his 
Miranda rights renders any purported waiver of those rights invalid. 
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E. It Cannot Be Proved that the Failure to Secure a Valid Waiver of Miranda 
Rights from Mr. Vos Was Harmless beyond a Reasonable Doubt. 
A Miranda violation may be excused if it is proved to be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. E.g., State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT App 30, f 11, 975 P.2d 469. This 
standard is far more demanding than, for example, a sufficiency of the evidence test: 
It is not enough that we would find sufficient evidence to support the 
conviction even if the statement is excised from the record. It is 
inconsequential that a retrial will most likely result in a conviction. 
"Beyond a reasonable doubt" requires the highest level of certainly known 
to our legal system in the resolution of a disputed factual matter. 
D a / * / ^ / , 931P.2dat867. 
Point III(A), sections 1-3, describe the prejudice caused by the detective's use of 
the statement at trial. To summarize, the statement provided the prosecution's only direct 
evidence that Mr. Vos was involved in the shooting. The prosecution's strongest 
circumstantial evidence tying Mr. Vos to the incident was his presence a block north of 
700 North, some five to eight minutes before the shooting occurred. (R. 260 at 50-53, 
75.) This, however, is also the neighborhood in which Mr, Vos lives. The statement 
prevented Mr. Vos from putting identity into issue. It locked him into a case based upon 
self-defense. This, in turn, required him to testify, and deprived him of the right to 
confront adverse witnesses with their inability to link him to the scene. The statement 
was used not only to prove the homicide charge, but especially to undermine Mr. Vos's 
self-defense claim. 
Under the standard that "requires the highest level of certainly known to our legal 
system," whether Mr. Vos might again be convicted on retrial is irrelevant. Dahlquist, 
931 P.2d at 867. It simply cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement 
did not harm Mr. Vos's defense against the homicide charge or his ability to assert a self-
defense claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bucher provided deficient representation. So deficient that prejudice may be 
presumed. In the alternative, actual prejudice is apparent. Mr. Vos did not voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights before giving police a statement. 
The trial court erred in holding to the contrary. 
Mr. Vos's conviction should be vacated, his and Mr. Bucher's pretrial statements 
suppressed, and a new trial granted. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
United States Constitution 
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of 
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination 
to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the 
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
ADDENDUM B 
Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-5-203 (2003). Murder 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) a violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab Act; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18 
years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301: 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 76-5-
404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the 
actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another; 
(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight 
from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to 
the predicate offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of the 
commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or 
attempted commission of any predicate offense; and 
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the commission or 
attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section 76-8-305 
if the actor uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is reduced 
pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established under 
Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the 
defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another: 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or 
excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under 
the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2- 305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or the 
reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
ADDENDUM C 
PWffl BI8TBICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County A ™ ' 2 2005 
BYRON F. BURMESTER, 6844 ^ 
CLARK A. HARMS, 5713 5y / T O ^ 
Deputy District Attorney Deputy c i s * 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 





FINDING OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(Re: Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Statements) 
Case No.041906923 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements came before the Court for hearing on March 
14, 2005. Defendant Isaiah Vos was present, and was represented by counsel, Stephen R. 
McCaughey. The State was represented by Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorneys B. Fred 
Burmester and Clark A. Harms. The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, District Court Judge, 
presided. The Court heard testimony, received evidence, heard the arguments of counsel. The 
Court thereafter took the matter under advisement, and issued it's Minute Entry ruling on March 
22,2005. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony adduced at the March 14, 2005 evidentiary 
hearing, and based upon good cause, the Court now makes and enters the following Findings of 
Fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 21, 2004, Jeffrey Maestas ("Maestas") was shot four times while he 
was involved in an altercation or confrontation of some sort with another person at 
approximately 1832 West 700 North, in Salt Lake City, Utah. Maestas eventually died from 
these injuries. 
2. During the investigation following Maestas' death, suspicion quickly turned to 
Isaiah Bo'Cage Vos ("Vos") as a possible suspect in the shooting death of Maestas. Within a 
few hours, Salt Lake City Police Department officers began looking for Vos, and letting it be 
known among Vos' associates that he was being sought for questioning in Maestas' death. 
3. On October 22, 2004, Detective Cordon Parks of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department Homicide Squad received a telephone call from John Bucher who identified himself 
as Isaiah Vos' lawyer, and sought to arrange the surrender of Vos to the police. 
4. Late in the evening of October 22, 2004, Vos surrendered to police at the law 
offices of John Bucher. By that time, police had developed probable cause to arrest Vos for the 
shooting death of Maestas. Vos was booked into the Salt Lake CountyAdult Detention Center at 
7:40 p.m. that evening. 
5. At the time of his arrest on October 22, 2004, Vos was given his Miranda 
waniings, and invoked his right to an attomey. No questioning of Vos was thereafter attempted 
by police officers. 
6. Following Vos' arrest, John Bucher subsequently arranged for Vos to make a 
statement to the police. Bucher testified that it was his intent was to establish what he perceived 
as his client's best defense, based on the evidence available to him at the time, of self-defense or 
imperfect self-defense. Bucher further testified that his strategy was then to seek a favorable plea 
bargain from the State by urging his client's cooperation. 
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7. On October 26, 2004, Vos was interviewed while in custody at the Salt Lake 
County Adult Detention Center. In addition to Vos and Detective Parks, Vos' attorney, John 
Bucher, was present. Vos' interview was tape recorded by Detective Parks. 
8. As the interview commenced, Miranda warnings were waived by Mr. Bucher, and 
he remained present with his client for the duration and totality of the interview by Detective 
Parks. 
9. Vos was advised by his attorney, John Boucher, that he ought to waive his right to 
remain silent and give a statement to Detective Parks. 
10. Vos' October 26, 2004 statements to Detective Parks were made knowingly, 
voluntarily, and upon the advice of his attorney. 
11. Vos' October 26, 2004 statements to Detective Parks were made as part of the 
cogent and joint strategy of Vos and his attorney to argue that Maestas had been killed in sel-
defense, or that at most, Vos was guilty of manslaughter, arising from an imperfect use of deadly 
force in circumstances not amounting to reasonable self-defense. 
12. The presence of Vos' attorney during the October 26, 2004 interview with 
Detective Parks was an adequate protective device, and made the process of police interrogation 
conform to the dictates of Vos' constitutional privileges. 
13. The presence of Vos' attorney during the October 26, 2004 interview with 
Detective Parks insured that Vos' statements were not the product of compulsion. 
14. On October 26, 2004, Vos' counsel at the time, John Bucher, arranged for he and 
Vos to meet with Detective Parks at the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Center. Mr. Bucher 
specifically insured that Vos' Miranda rights were waived, and gave Vos the opportunity to 
change his mind about discussing the case with Detective Parks. 
15. At the beginning of the interview, Mr. Bucher explained his strategy for the case, 
relating to advantages of "telling the whole story" given that it is a "gang case", and the defense 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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put forth by both Vos and his attorney was seld-defense, or at worst, imperfect self-defense 
manslaughter. 
16. Mr. Bucher also told Vos, in the presence of Detective Parks, that his usual advice 
to criminal defendants is to "not talk to anybody about anything" but that the circumstances of 
this case are different. 
17. Mr. Bucher asked Vos to waive his right to remain silent and talk to Detective 
Parks. 
18. Mr. Bucher spoke with Vos alone, before the interview recommenced, afterwhich 
Vos agreed to proceed with the interview. 
19. The strategy of both Vos and Mr. Bucher in speaking with Detective Parks was to 
try and convince Detective Parks, and tlirough him the prosecution, that either Vos actions in 
shooting Maestas were justified, or at worst, imperfect self-defense manslaughter. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In the instant case it is clear that no Miranda violation nor coercion occurred, 
because Vos' counsel was present when Vos voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and then 
made statements to Detective Parks. Vos' attorney initiated contact with Detective Parks, both to 
arrange for Vos to turn himself in to the police, and later to meet with Detective Parks at the jail 
to discuss this case. 
2. Although Vos' statement was made while in custody, it was clearly made 
knowingly, voluntarily, and in the presence of counsel. 
3. Vos has not presented any argument to show that his prior counsel's (Mr. 
Bucher's) performance was objectively deficient. 
\\A> 
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4. Utah courts place the burden of proving an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
on the defendant, requiring him to prove there was a "lack of any conceivable tactical basis for 
counsel's actions." State v. Mecham, 2000 UT 247, 1|22, 9 P.3d 777 (quoting State v. Garrett, 
849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). 
5. Further, the Utah court of appeals has based its view on the U.S. Supreme Court's 
view in Strickland, holding that there is a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.. .defendant must overcome the presumption 
that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Id. 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)). 
6. It is clear that Mr. Bucher's performance in this case shows that there was a 
tactical and rational basis for his actions in advising Vos. 
7. Further, Vos has not presented any argument to try to overcome the strong 
presumption in favor of defense counsel's conduct falling within the "wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.." 
8. Therefore, Vos' motion to suppress his October 26, 2004 statements should be 
denied. 
DATED this iJk day of April, 200 
BY TfflE COURT: 
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Motion To Suppress Statements 
CaseNo.041906923 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements came before the Court for hearing on March 
14, 2005. Defendant Isaiah Vos was present, and was represented by counsel, Stephen R. 
McCaughey. The State was represented by Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorneys B. Fred 
Burmester and Clark A. Harms. The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, District Court Judge, 
presided. The Court heard testimony, received evidence, heard the arguments of counsel. The 
Court thereafter took the matter under advisement, and issued it's Minute Entry ruling on March 
22, 2005. 
The Court has made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based 
upon the evidence and testimony adduced at the March 14, 2005 evidentiary hearing, based upon 
the Court's previously made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. And based 
upon good cause, the Court now makes and enters the following Order: 
mm BISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 2 9 2005 
SALT UKE&OUNTY By. 
Deputy Clerk" 
ORDER Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Suppress his October 26, 2004 statements is denied 
DATED this # day of 
•*-y N . * - ^ : 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements was delivered to STEPHEN R. MCCAUGHEY, 
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*** 
THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Isiah Vos# 
Case No. 041906923. 
Counsel, state your appearance for the record. 
MR. BURMESTER: Fred Burmester for the State, and 
Clark Harms for the State. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Steven McCaughey and Jeremy Delicino 
for Mr. Vos, who is also present. 
THE COURT: Are you Isiah Vos? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey is your lawyer as well as 
Mr. Delicino? 
THE DEFENDANT: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Now is the time set for 
Defendant's motion to suppress. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: As a preliminary matter, we 
approached the Court a couple of weeks ago and obtained a 
continuance of this trial date, and I would like to file with 
the Court a waiver of right to a speedy trial, which has been 
executed by my client. 
THE COURT: Very well, you may, Mr. McCaughey. 
Mr. Vos, you understand your attorneys have sought a 
continuance of the trial date from the original date that was 
4 
1 scheduled at your arraignment to the date of the 12th of April? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: And this has been done with your 
4 agreement, sir? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: And specifically you have agreed, for the 
7 purpose of accommodating your lawyers1 efforts to defend you, 
8 to waive your right to a speedy trial to the 12th of April? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Correct. 
10 THE COURT: You"ve done that freely and voluntarily? 
11 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: Very well. I will accept your 
13 continuance. 
14 MR. McCAUGHEY: Thank you. The first witness we'll 











DETECTIVE GORDON PARKS 
Called by the Defendant, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: You may be seated here at the witness 
stand. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MCCAUGHEY; 
Q. Mr. Parks, if you'll state your name and occupation. 
A. Gordon Parks. I'm a police officer for 
Salt Lake City Corporation. 
Q. You've been so for how long? 
A. Twenty-six years. 
Q. I'm calling your attention back in October of 2004, 
you were involved in a - the investigation of a homicide of a 
Mr. Maestas; is that right? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And sometime during that investigation, you received 
a telephone call from somebody involved about Mr. Vos 
surrendering himself; is that right? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Do you have some notes that you've taken on this — 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. -- that you've used to refresh your memory? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell me about when that occurred? 
A. That would be October 22nd at 12:18 in the afternoon, 
Q. Okay. Do you remember who you talked to? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Who was it? 


























A. Blake Tademy. 
THE COURT: State that name again. 
THE WITNESS: Blake Tademy. 
Q. (BY MR. McCAUGHEY) Do you know his relationship to 
Mr. Vos? 
A. I don't know exactly, but I believe he's an uncle. 
Q. Subsequent to that conversation, Mr. Vos did, in 
fact, surrender to you, did he not? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. What day was that? 
A. That was October the 22nd at 4:31 in the afternoon. 
Q. Where did that surrender take place? 
A. Mr. Vos's attorney's office, John Bucher's office. 
Q. You took Mr. Vos into custody? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Vos at that 
time? 
A. No, not a Miranda'd statement. Of course I talked to 
him, but there was no questioning done at that time. 
Q. No statement was elicited --
A. No. 
Q. -- that had any evidentiary value? 
A. Mr. Bucher was up north somewhere and was on his way 
back into town. We talked on the phone. He said he would be 
representing Mr. Vos, and he specifically stated that Isiah was 
not to be questioned. 
Q. All right. So the next time that you saw Mr. Vos 
would have been when? 
A. In the Salt Lake County Jail several days later. 
Q. Would that have been May the 27th of October? 
A. I believe it was. 
Q. Why did you go to the Salt Lake County Jail? 
A. Mr. Bucher and I had a conversation earlier in the 
day. I can't remember if I called him or he called me. 
Mr. Bucher and I talked. He said Mr. Vos wanted to make a 
statement about the case. 
Q. All right. What did you do in response to that? 
A. Made an appointment with Mr. Bucher. We went to the 
Salt Lake County Jail together. We met in the parking lot, and 
we went in together to meet with Mr. Vos. 
Q. Did you, prior to that meeting with Isiah Vos, did 
you have a conversation with Mr. Vos? Did you have a 
conversation with Mr. Burmester or Mr. Harms? 
A, We screened the case on, I believe, on October 25th, 
two days later. 
Q. All right. And did you -- after Mr. Bucher called 
you, did you call either of these gentlemen and let them know 
that this defendant wanted to make a statement? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. You did not? 
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1 A. No, sir, 
2 Q. Do you recall Mr. Burmester calling you and telling 
3 you that Mr. Vos wanted to make a statement and you should 
4 contact him? 
5 A. No, I don't believe he ever did. 
6 Q. Okay. What's been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 1, 
7 i t ' s a stipulation of fact as to what happened in this 
8 conversation between Mr. Bucher and the prosecutors. 
9 MR. BURMESTER: Can I see that one quick second? 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Is there any objection to 
11 Exhibit 1? 
12 MR. BURMESTER: No, Your Honor. 
13 MR. HARMS: No, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: It represents a stipulation of a 
15 telephone conversation that the witness has testified that to 
16 his knowledge did not occur, is that what we are dealing with? 
17 MR. HARMS: Yes. It's a conversation between 
18 Mr. Burmester and Mr. Bucher, and Mr. Parks --
19 THE COURT: And Mr. Bucher? 
20 MR. HARMS: Detective Parks was not a party to the 
21 conversation. 
22 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, gentlemen. 
23 Exhibit 1 is received. 
24 I (Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 
25 I was received into evidence.) 
Q. (BY MR. McCAUGHEY) So# Mr. Parks, during that 
conversation what did you say to Mr. Bucher before you went in 
to see Mr. Vos? 
A. I'm sorry, I'm unclear on the question. You mean in 
the parking lot before we went in? 
Q. Right. 
A. Mr. Bucher said they did not want to talk about the 
gun. I was not to ask any questions about the gun, that the 
gun was destroyed and couldn't be used in any more crimes. 
Q. Did you indicate to Mr. Bucher at all there was an 
eyewitness to the crime? 
A. Oh, I don't recall. I think that in our previous 
conversations with Isiah's mother and again with Mr. Bucher 
that, yes, there were lots of witnesses. 
Q. Lots of witnesses to the crime? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you specifically tell him that there were a 
couple of eyewitnesses to the crime? 
A. I believe I did. 
Q. Did you tell them whether or not those eyewitnesses 
could identify Mr. Vos? 
A. I don't remember specifically, but I probably did* 
Q. Did you tell them that they could identify Mr. Vos? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who were those two eyewitnesses? 
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1 A. Well, the only eyewitness that I had that could 
2 identify Isiah Vos was the man that drove him away from the 
3 scene, Anthony Ferguson. 
4 1 Q. But you may have told Mr. Bucher and Isiah's mother 
5 that you had other eyewitnesses? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. When, in fact, you didn't? 
8 A. Not identifying witnesses, no. 
9 Q. Not eyewitnesses? 
10 A. Well, there's eyewitnesses that saw the crime but did 
11 not know the identity of Isiah Vos. 
12 Q. But you did not tell that to Mr. Bucher or his 
13 mother; right? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. In fact, you had nobody at that particular point, did 
16 you. 
17 MR. BURMESTER: Objection; leading. 
18 THE COURT: I'm approaching this from the perspective 
19 that this is an adverse witness. This is the principal 
20 investigator in this case and the defense is seeking to show 
21 suppression, and I will allow examination to proceed as an 
22 adverse witness. 
23 MR. BURMESTER: Okay. 
24 Q. (BY MR. McCAUGHEY) At that time you had no witness 
25 that could identify Isiah Vos as the shooter; is that fair to 
say? 
A, No. I have Anthony Ferguson who saw the fight and 
did identify Isiah Vos as the man fighting with 
Jeffrey Maestas# and the man who chased him up the driveway. 
Q. All right. Did he see him shoot him? 
A. He saw the altercation, but he said he was unaware 
that there was a gun involved. 
Q. So you had a conversation outside of the jail. You 
went into the jail and met with Mr. Vos; is that correct? 
A • x es. 
Q. And you met with him in one of the contact booths at 
the --at one of the cell blocks; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tell me what happened then. 
A. Well, we went in. Isiah came out. We met in a small 
conference room. Isiah said he wanted to talk to his attorney 
without me being present, so I exited the room and waited. 
They called me in and I went back in and Isiah made a 
statement. 
Q. Okay. Was there anything said by Mr. Bucher to you 
during that time period? 
A. No. 
Q. So basically Mr. Bucher -- you left -- they had a 
conversation, you came back, Mr. Vos gave a statement? 
A. Yes, sir. 


























Q. No other conversation prior to that? 
A. Oh, I can remember Mr. Bucher made some -- I started 
my tape machine, and Mr. Bucher made some introductory sorts of 
statements before Isiah talked. 
Q. All right. You did not read Miranda warnings? 
A. No, I did not to Mr. Vos; right. 
Q. Is there a reason for that? 
A. His attorney was present and represented him on that 
matter. 
Q. All right. Did you ask his lawyer whether he had 
mentioned some Miranda warnings to him? 
A. I don't understand the question. 
Q. Did you ask his lawyer, Mr. Bucher, whether or not he 
had gone over the Miranda warnings with his client? 
A. No. 
Q. So you took a statement at that time, a recorded 






And anything of interest occur 
THE COURT: Excuse me? 




No. We just left the jail and 
Okay. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: That's all. 
after that statement? 
interest occur after 
left Isiah there. 
THE COURT: All right. You may cross-examine the 
witness. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BURMESTER; 
Q. Do you recall whether --
Do you want to retrieve these? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: No. 
Q. (BY MR. BURMESTER) Do you recall whether Mr. Bucher 
said in this interview, the introductory sort of things, did 
that include a recounting of the rights or an assertion of 
rights? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Well, I111 object to that as being 
leading. 
THE COURT: Well, it is leading, but you called the 
witness, so he's cross-examining the witness. 
Go ahead, state the question again. 
Q. (BY MR. BURMESTER) Do you recall if Mr. Bucher 
mentioned anything about Mr. Vos's rights in those introductory 
comments? 
A. I'd have to read the transcript, but what I recall 
Mr. Bucher said is that Mr. Isiah wanted to make a statement. 
He was fully aware of his rights, and he just wanted to make a 
statement because it would aid in his defense and the defense 
they were planning. 
Q. So do you -- you don't recall specifically about 
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1 rights? 
2 A. I don't recall the exact words that were said, no, 
3 but just that he was present and was representing Isiah, and 
4 that Isiah was going to waive his rights and make a statement 
5 about the homicide. 
6 MR. BURMESTER: May I approach? 
7 THE COURT: Yes. 
8 Q. (BY MR. BURMESTER) Do you r e c o g n i z e t h i s ? 
9 A. This looks l i k e a t r a n s c r i p t from the j a i l 
10 conversation. 
11 Q. The same conversation that we were talking about? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. I'd like to refer you to page 2. 
14 THE COURT; Is this marked as an exhibit, Counsel? 
15 MR. BURMESTER: It is not at this point* 
16 THE COURT: If we're going to have the witness 
17 testify from the document, or maybe you're going to --
18 MR. BURMESTER: I'm just going to have him refresh 
19 his recollection from it. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 Q. (BY MR. BURMESTER) Just further your recollection 
22 from lines 36 through 30, and read it silently to yourself. 
23 A. Starting with line --
24 Q. No, no, silently to yourself. 
25 A. Okay. 
Yes, Mr. Bucher asked his client --
Q. You don't need to testify to anything. 
Then I would just like for you to read lines 22 
through 25 on page 3; silently again. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Now, having had an opportunity to reread the 
transcript, does that refresh your recollection on whether 
Mr. Bucher said anything about rights? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what do you recall now? 
A. Mr. Bucher advised his clients of his constitutional 
rights to remain silent, and they decided to make the 
statement. 
Q. All right. Now, let's go back to the beginning of 
this investigation. About what time is the initial officer 
dispatched? 
A. 4:38 p.m. 
Q. And okay. And do you recall what day of the week 
October 21st was? 
A. I think it's a Thursday. 
Q. So it's a normal workday? 
A. Yes. 
Q. About what time were you dispatched on this case? 
A. I was notified right at 5:00. 
Q. Do you recall how many witnesses to the shooting were 
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1 identified? 
2 A. I don't recall, but there were seven or eight. 
3 Q. All right. Did you or one of your detectives have an 
4 opportunity to talk to a witness named Melissa Adams? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And how about a witness named Janice Wood? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Could you summarize basically what they told your 
9 officers? 
10 A. A summary of all the witnesses is that they saw a 
11 teal-colored Ford Taurus driving on 700 North. The car pulled 
12 to the north side of the road. The driver got out, went to the 
13 rear of his car, and confronted the pedestrian who was on the 
14 sidewalk on the north side of 700 North. 
15 Q. And then did they say anything about the pedestrian's 
16 response to that? 
17 A. They said it looked like a confrontation between the 
18 two, and the pedestrian had a handgun and shot the driver of 
19 the Ford Taurus. 
20 Q. What did they say the pedestrian did? 
21 A. He ran westbound and flagged down a teal-colored Ford 
22 Explorer SUV. It appeared out of nowhere they said. He jumped 
23 in the passenger side of that car and left the area. 
24 Q. Did you happen to talk to or your detectives talk to 
25 a witness named David Durr? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did David Durr say in summary? 
A. He said just prior to the shooting he saw Isiah Vos 
walking on Star Crest Aveue# in the area -- well, of Star Crest 
and 700 North. 
Q. Is that approximately the address of the shooting? 
A. Yes. That's right where the shooting occurred. 
Q. That's at 4:30, did you say? 
A. I don't recall. I did not interview Mr. Durr, so I 
don't recall the exact time. 
I was briefed by Officer Knighten, I believe, who 
interviewed Mr. Durr, and Knighten informed me that the time 
periods would be within of about one or two minutes at the time 
of the shooting. 
Q. Okay. And did you become aware of who the operator 
of this SUV was? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who did you identify as the operator of the SUV? 
A. Anthony Ferguson. 
Q. Okay. Now -- and Anthony Ferguson, did he claim to 
know this passenger? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. And who did he identify to you that it was? 
A. Isiah Vos. 
Q. Okay. Did Mr. Bucher call you early before 
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1 10:00 a.m., I guess, on October 27th? 
2 A, Yes, he had. 
3 Q. And at that point did he say something to you about 
4 making a statement and the reason? 
5 A. Yes, he did. 
6 Q. What did he say? 
7 A. Well, we talked about the case, and he said that 
8 identity wasn't an issue, that the case had self-defense 
9 aspects of it that he wanted to get out, and Isiah wanted to 
10 make a statement, and they were going to claim a defense of 
11 imperfect self-defense is what he called it. 
12 Q. And in those introductory comments that they made at 
13 the jail, didn't Mr. Bucher talk about wanting to establish a 
14 good relationship with the DA in order to facilitate its 
15 settling of the case? 
16 A. Yes, he did. 
17 Q. Did the defendant, at least through his attorney, 
18 assert his right, then, to remain silent with regards to the 
19 murder weapon? 
20 A. Yes, he did. 
21 MR. BURMESTER: If I can have just one more minute, 
22 Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: You may. 
24 MR. BURMESTER: I have nothing further. Thanks. 
25 THE COURT: Redirect? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Officer Parks, you may step 
down, sir, thank you. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: We'll call Mr. Bucher. 
THE COURT: Very well. Come forward and be sworn. 
JOHN BUCHER, ESQ. 
Called by the Defendant, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MCCAUGHEY: 
Q. Please state your name and address. 
A. John Bucher, B-U-C-H-E-R, 957 First Avenue. 
Q. Your occupation? 
A. I'm an attorney. 
Q. Mr. Bucher, you were contacted by somebody for 
Isiah Vos around the 22nd of October, were you not? 
A. Yes. I can't find my file so exact dates are going 
to throw me a little bit, but that's about it. 
Q. Okay. And can you tell me who contacted you? 
John Bucher, Esq. - Direct by Mr. McCaughey 20 
1 A, I believe his mother first contacted me and explained 
2 the situation, and I then told her that it's very necessary to 
3 get him off the street as soon as possible. And I think -- I 
4 don't know where I got Detective Parks' name, phone number, I 
5 think, I don't know how that worked, but we became in touch 
6 with each other to arrange that surrender. 
7 Q. And you were retained by the Vos family at that time? 
8 A. The mother, I think. 
9 Q. Okay. So you did call Mr. Parks. Did you have a 
10 conversation with him? 
A. I did. 
Q. And tell me about that conversation. 
A. I think I made the initial contact to him. I told 
him I had a little problem, that I thought it was important to 
expedite his surrender for lots of reasons, his own safety, 
primarily. But I was out of town, I was on my way back from a 
little farm I have, and it was -- it was two, three hours away, 
and so I asked that it take place at my office. I think that's 
the way it went. 


















Q. Shortly thereafter, I mean, that day? 
A. I think it was that day. Could have been the day 
after, but I'm pretty sure it was that day. 
Q. So you surrendered him to Mr. Parks. Did you have 
any further conversation about the case with Mr. Parks? 
A. At that time I think I did. I wanted to know either 
at the time of the surrender or subsequent to it, I wanted to 
know more facts about the thing. I didn't understand the 
facts. 
Q. Okay. 
A. So I think he gave me a rendition of the factual 
circumstances surrounding the crime. 
Q. Did he indicate to you that he had several 
eyewitnesses? 
A. Yes. 
Q, And did he indicate to you that those eyewitnesses 
could identify your client as the shooter? 
A. He mentioned the one, which was the name of the 
driver that picked up -- picked up Isiah; he mentioned him. He 
mentioned one or two others, but did not -- I mean, I think he 
told me that they were witnesses to the shooting, but he did 
not tell me whether or not they knew who Isiah Vos was. Only 
one person knew who Isiah Vos was, and that was the man that --
the boy that picked him up at the crime scene. 
Q. Did you -- did you extrapolate from the conversation 
with Detective Parks that there was somebody who could identify 
Mr. Vos as the shooter? 
A. Yes. 
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1 Q. Okay. That was the impression that you received from 
2 him? 
3 A. That there was several that could once they knew who 
4 Isiah Vos -- once they saw his photograph. He seemed to 
5 indicate that in a report also. As I say# I can't find my 
6 files. I was going to read it before I came down here, but I 
7 must have given it back up# because I --
8 Q. Did that conversation -- did Detective Parks have an 
9 influence on your advice to Mr. Vos? 
10 A. A very strong influence. I knew there was no weapon. 
11 I knew that they didn't have a weapon, and so I thought that 
12 there was a small defect in the case. 
13 But back then, upon hearing the history of the victim 
14 and Mr. Vos and the identification of the witnesses, I came to 
15 the conclusion that this case should not be approached as a --
16 as a "who dunnit," as an identification case, but that it must 
17 be approached another way or -- the defense I had in mind would 
18 be inconsistent with an identification case. So pretty early 
19 in the thing, I wanted to — I wanted to make a statement and 
20 tell the detective the history of the victim and Mr. Vos. 
21 Q. And the reason for that was because you were under 
22 the impression that somebody could identify him as a shooter? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. So somewhere along the road you had a conversation 
25 with Mr. Vos when you talked about giving a statement? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. I take it that was subsequent to the conversation 
that you had with Detective Parks that we alluded to? 
A. Yes. And I think it was subsequent to a conversation 
that I had with Mr. Burmester. I can't remember if I talked to 
Burmester after I talked to Parks. At least, I called and left 
word with Burmester's office that I was going to go and make a 
statement -- I mean, we were going to have a statement made 
with Detective Parks. I may have spoken to Mr. Burmester 
before the statement. 
Q. But you can't recall? 
A. But I can't recall. 
Q. You went down sometime -- you went down and saw 
Mr. Vos with Mr. Parks; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Isiah know that Mr. Parks was coming, to the best 
of your knowledge. 
A. I assume so. I can't remember how -- when he would 
become aware of that, but I assume so. 
Q. And you talked to him about giving a statement to the 
police prior to taking Mr. Parks down? 
A. I talked to him about how to do the case. Exactly 
what the statement was and when it was going to take place, I 
don' t think he knew that. 
Q. Okay. But you talked with him about the possibility 
























of giving a statement? 
A, Yes, 
Q. And what was his reaction? 
A. He was -- I don't know if reluctant is the right 
word# he was uncomfortable with giving a statement. We had to 
go through the evidence against him and the possible 
consequences. 
And what I hoped to do with the prosecution, I hoped 
to do two things: I hoped to either try the thing under the 
idea that he was acting in self-defense
 f or they give me a plea 
bargain that would be shy of a First Degree murder. 
And then the third thing was I wanted a treatment on 
a bail. I wanted to reduce his bail so that he could get out 
of jail and out of town for a while because things were hot. 
This victim was associated with -- I can't remember which 
gang -- and they were causing some significant trouble to the 
mother, and I also thought they were also going to cause 
significant trouble to Mr, Vos because it was hotter than I'd 
seen for a while. This was evidently an important figure or a 
son of an important figure in that gang. 
Q, So at that time you had nothing from the police 
report, you only had information given to you by Parks and 
information, I assume, given to you by your client? 
A. I don't know. I remember reading a police report, 
and I don't know if it was before I spoke -- before he went 
into the jail or afterwards. It was very — around there# but 
I can't recall. 
Q. Okay. And you can't remember whether or not you 
talked to either of these district attorneys here about the 
effective cooperation, anything like that, prior to the 
statement being --
A. Prior to the statement being given? 
Q. -- prior to the statement being given. 
A. No. 
Q. You had not talked to him about any consideration? 
A. I'm quite sure not if it was prior. I was flying on 
an assumption that -- I think I talked to Detective Parks, that 
if I cooperated with him, he would note that to the -- to 
Mr. Harms and Mr. Burmester, and then that would be worth 
something in my negotiations. 
Q. All right. So you went down to the jail with 
Mr. Parks, and you went in and you saw Isiah. Tell me what 
happened there. 
A. Well, as I say, Isiah was uncomfortable, and I asked 
the officer to leave, and we had a lengthy conversation. And I 
suppose I'm at liberty to talk about that. 
Q. Sure. 
A. We had a lengthy conversation concerning the nature 
of this case and the way that I thought it had to be done. I 
came to the conclusion early on that he was in true fear of 


























this Maestas, that he didn't go hunting Maestas; that the 
aggressor, it was always the indications it was the victim. 
And I felt that Isiah was telling me the truth, and I 
thought he was a credible witnesses. And there were other 
credible facts to backup his story, so I thought that was the 
way to approach this case because he was credible. 
Q. What did Isiah say about that? 
A. Specifically, I can't remember. All I remember is 
him being uncomfortable with it, questioning me about it, 
another way to go on it. At one point I think he said, "Could 
we do both, could we question my identity and still do a 
self-defense or modified self-defense?" 
I said, "They are inconsistent. When you get a jury 
to give us the time of day, if we're going to modify that it 
was self-defense, we got to be completely truthful." 
Q. Did you say -- in your opinion, did you have to talk 
Mr. Vos into giving this statement? 
A. It was close, it was close. He did not --he didn't 
see my point of view on the thing, but I took that as his lack 
of experience in this kind of thing. I don't -- I can't 
remember what his criminal record is, but he's never been 
involved in anything like this, so I took his reluctance as a 
lack of experience rather than he knew something I didn't know. 
Q. Plus, you were operating under the assumption that 
there was someone who could identify him as the shooter? 
A. More than one. 
Q. More than one? 
THE COURT: All right. Any further examination? 
MR. HARMS: Briefly, Your Honor, thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HARMS: 
Q. Mr. Bucher, before the statement at the jail between 
Detective Parks and Mr. Vos# you had the opportunity to review 
the Information that was filed against Mr. Vos; is that 
correct? 
A. I'm quite sure that's true. 
Q. And received some initial discovery? 
A. I'm sure that's true, too. As I say, I remember 
reading something just prior to the jail-house interview. I'm 
quite sure it's true, yes. 
Q. And you had had several conversations with Mr. Vos 
from the time that his mother contacted you on the 22nd to the 
25th, didn't you? 
A. We had a chance to talk very much. He, at the 
most -- the longest conversation was after I had received some 
materials and we were in the jail at the time of the interview. 
Q. And you had spoken to Mr. Vos about the weapon that 
was used in this crime? 
A, Yes. 
Q. And you told Detective Parks on the 27th that you and 
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1 Mr. Vos refused to talk about that weapon; correct? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Because you knew from your conversations with Mr. Vos 
4 that the weapon had been destroyed? 
5 A. I guess I have to answer that in -- it has to be in 
6 the affirmative. 
7 Q. And you told Detective Parks that your client would 
8 be implicated in another crime if, in fact, they talked about 
9 the gun, so they didn't want to? 
10 A. And I didn't know all the details about how the gun 
11 was destroyed. I did not want to bring anyone else in that 
12 family into it. I didn't want to know the details of how that 
13 gun was destroyed, but I did not want to implicate anyone else 
14 in that. 
15 Q. So in addition to knowing that the police had 
16 identified Mr. Ferguson, who drove Mr. Vos away from the seen, 
17 you knew that your client didn't want to talk about the weapon 
18 because it might implicate him or his family members in an 
19 additional crime? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. So identity still was not at issue in addition to 
22 what Detective Parks had told you based upon your conversations 
23 with your own client. You didn't feel as though identity was 
24 the best defense in this matter? 


























people at the scene. 
Q. And based upon that, you felt -- also based upon what 
your client told you, that, in fact, an imperfect self-defense 
would be the defense you'd want to use at trial? 
A. I thought at the time it was either that or some sort 
of psychological defense. It was my only defense. 
Q. And, in fact, it was reasonable in your mind to 
pursue an imperfect self-defense or self-defense theory of the 
case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it wouldn't surprise you to learn that that's the 
same theory being followed by subsequent counsel? 
A. It would surprise me. 
Q, It wouldn't surprise you --
A. It would surprise me if they're going to follow the 
same theory because then why are we talking about identity for? 
I don't see how those two can be consistent in any way. 
Q. And it was your strategy, from the moment you learned 
what you did about this case, to pursue this imperfect 
self-defense theory? 
A. Yes. There's much substantiation for -- the history 
of the defendant and this family in this gang goes back some 
many months. 
Q. And there was never a promise of leniency extended by 
prosecution to either you or Mr. Vos in exchange for his 






MR. HARMS: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Is there anything further? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: No, no. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bucher, you may step down, sir, thank 
Do you have any other witnesses? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: One more: Mr. Vos. 
THE COURT: Come forward, Mr. Vos. You may take the 
thout raising your right hand. 
MR. BUCHER: May I be excused? 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: No objection. 
THE COURT: All right. You're free to go, 
Mr. Bucher. 
ISIAH B. VOS 
Called by the Defendant, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I do. 
,T<~>hn R TI r> h #= T- . R Q rr - f r n a a h v Mr. Harms *^ 1 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, MCCAUGHEY; 
Q. State your full name and address. 
A. Isiah Vos. My current address? 
Q. Your current address. 
A. 3415 South 900 West, Salt Lake County Adult Detention 
Center. 
Q. Mr. Vos# you were — you surrendered, turned yourself 
in on this particular offense; right? 
A. Yes, that's correct. I surrendered myself in the 
afternoon of October 22nd to Detective Gordon Parks and another 
officer who was with him. 
Q. All right. And Mr. Bucher was your attorney at that 
time; right? 
A. Yes. We had retained him that same day earlier in 
the afternoon to be my attorney. 
Q. All right. And there came a time, did there not, on 
the 27th of October where Mr. Bucher and Mr. Parks came down to 
see you in the jail? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. And you had a conversation prior to that with 
Mr. Bucher about making a statement to the police? 
A. I had a conversation with Mr. Bucher prior to meeting 
with him and Detective Parks, but it was not concerning giving 
a statement. 
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1 Q. Okay. Okay. So they brought you out into the 
2 holding cell, and Mr. Bucher was there with Mr. Parks; right? 
3 A. That's correct. 
4 1 Q. Was that a surprise to you? 
5 A. Yes, it was. 
6 Q. Tell me what you said to Mr. Bucher at that time and 
7 what he said to you. 
8 A. Urn -- I asked Mr. Bucher, while him and 
9 Detective Parks were in the room, why he had brang 
10 Detective Parks down to the jail, and he asked Mr. Parks to 
11 step out of the room. Mr. Parks stepped out of the room, went 
12 into the room that is right next to us, and I proceeded to talk 
13 to Mr. Bucher why he brang him down. 
14 Q. Okay. Tell me what was said by Mr. Bucher and what 
15 you said. 
16 A. Mr. Bucher stated that he wanted me to give a 
17 statement on regards of the self-defense, that --he told me 
18 that that would be the only way that I would be able to have 
19 any leniency from the prosecution or any way that I'd be able 
2 0 to better myself in this case. 
21 I refused. I didn't want to give a statement at all, 
22 and he kept insisting and kept insisting that I do give a 
23 statement. He told me that they had a substantial amount of 
24 evidence against me that would show that I was the -- that I 
25 was guilty of the crime, and that the only way I'd be able to 
have any benefits is by the statement. 
Q. Did he tell you they had people, witnesses who had 
seen you shoot? 
A. I believe he told me that they had witnesses who seen 
the crime, and I believe he did say that they had witnesses who 
could identify me. 
Q. Okay. Did he tell you what had -- if there had been 
any promises or negotiations made on your behalf for you giving 
the statement? 
A. Urn -- I can recall that he said that he needed as 
much help from the District Attorney as possible, and that by 
giving the statement, that's what he was hoping for that would 
come forth by giving a statement. 
Q. Did he tell you that you didn't have to give a 
statement? 
A. He told me that I didn't have to talk about it or 
about — he told me I didn't have to talk about the gun 
specifically. About the statement, he never said that I didn't 
really have to give one, but I didn't want to, and he kept 
pushing forth that I do give a statement. 
Q. And so eventually you did go in and give a statement 
to Detective Parks, a recorded statement? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. And, now, when you gave the recorded statement 
and it was done and they turned the recorder off, did you say 
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1 anything after that? 
2 A. Yes, I did. 
3 Q. Okay. And about how long was that conversation after 
4 the recorder was turned off? 
5 A. Probably another five minutes. 
6 Q. Okay. And that was between you and Mr. Parks, 
7 basically? 
8 A. Me and Detective Parks talked about -- I went over 
9 that I felt empathy for the family, and that I was -- um --
10 scared for my life, and I told Mr. Parks I wish it wouldn't 
11 have happened. Then I told him that now, because of the 
12 situation I'm in, that I wish I was the one who had been shot. 
13 Q. Okay. 
14 MR. McCAUGHEY: That's all. 
15 I THE COURT: All right. Any cross-examination? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 











Q. How many times did you or Mr. Bucher, whomever, how 
many times did Detective Parks leave the room because you were 
uncomfortable in this jail? 
A. Only the one time. 
Q. Just one time? 
A. When they initially came in, they sat down. There 
was a couple of words said back and forth, then I asked 
Mr. Bucher why he brought Detective Parks. That's when 
Detective Parks exited the room. 
Q. Okay. All right. All right. So Mr. Bucher told you 
there were some eyewitnesses? 
A. Yes. There was one that I had already known of that 
had mentioned my name, and that was the driver of the teal Ford 
Explorer, Anthony Ferguson. 
Q. Anthony Ferguson? 
A. I had known that because of my paperwork that I 
received when I came -- when I was booked into the jail. 
Q. And did you -- you knew it from personal experience 
as well? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. But knowing that there was -- okay. So the only 
witness you're aware of is Ferguson, the eyewitness who could 
identify you? 
A. That's the one that I knew for a fact, that I was a 
hundred percent sure in my mind, then I believe that Mr. Bucher 
told me that there were other witnesses. 
Q. That there were other eyewitnesses? 
A. I believe so, yes. 
Q. Did he say that these other eyewitnesses could 
identify you? 
A. I don't specifically recall him exactly saying that 
they could or that they could not. 
Q. I see. But you knew there were a bunch of other 
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1 people around at that time? 
2 A. That is correct. 
3 MR. BURMESTER: Could I just have one moment? 
4 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
5 (Off-the-record discussion.) 
6 Q. (BY MR. BURMESTER) Now, you never did say anything 
7 about the gun, did you? 
8 A. I never mentioned the gun. 
9 Q. Because you didn't want to talk about the gun? 
10 A. Because Mr. Bucher advised me not to talk about the 
11 gun. I didn't want to talk about the whole situation# and he 
12 persuaded me to do that. And then while in his persuasion to 
13 do that# he told me not to mention the weapon. 
14 Q. Okay. But you're saying that --
15 THE COURT: No reason to repeat what he said, 
16 Counsel, I heard him. 
17 MR. BURMESTER: I was going to --
18 THE COURT: Whatever you were going to do, let's not 
19 repeat„ 
20 MR. BURMESTER: I'll do my best not to repeat. 
21 THE COURT: I'll do my best to remind you. 
22 MR. BURMESTER: There's no doubt about that. I think 
23 I'll leave it as that. 
24 THE COURT: Anything further? 
25 MR. McCAUGHEY: No questions. 
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THE COURT: All right. Mr, Vos, you may step down. 
Do you now rest? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: There's no further witnesses from the 
State; is that correct? 
MR. HARMS: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well, Counsel, before we go any 
further in this matter, I received the motion for discovery 
memoranda in support of it and an order proposed. Is there any 
objection to that? Have you seen these documents, 
Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I just received them this morning. 
If I can have just one second. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Yeah, I don't have a problem with it. 
THE COURT: Very well. I'll sign the order for 
providing discovery and the continuing to provide; therefore, 
there's no necessity for a hearing on the discovery. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Having said that, Counsel, it 
seems to me that your respective positions are quite well 
identified by your motion and response. Is there anything that 
you wish to say at this point? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: I'll submit it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Burmester? 







































BURMESTER: Your Honor, I'm going to 







the motion to suppress the 
shortly by minute-
nothing further, 
Thank you, Your 
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ADDENDUM E 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
ISIAH BO'CAGE VOS, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cindyb 
Reporter: MIDGLEY, ED 
Prosecutor: CLARK A HARMS 
BYRON F BURMESTER 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : STEPHEN R MCCAUGHEY 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 21, 1986 
CAT/CIC 
Tape Count: 10:34-10:46 
CHARGES 
1. MURDER - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/13/2005 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than six years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
S ENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041906923 FS 
Judge: J DENNIS FREDERICK 
Date: June 10, 2 0 05 
Case No: 041906923 
Date: Jun 10, 2005 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court grants credit for 231 days time served. 
Dated this 
Page 2 (last! 
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ADDENDUM F 
Stipulation to the testimony of Byron F. (Fred) Burmester 
Several days after screening and filing charges against Isaiah Vos, Fred Burmester 
believes he received a phone call from Jolm Bucher. In that conversation Bucher claimed 
to represent Vos and that he intended to have his client be interviewed because he felt 
that his client had a good self-defense claim. Fred Burmester believes that he told Bucher 
that Detective Cordon Parks of the Salt Lake City Police Department was the case 
manager and that he should contact Parks directly and schedule the interview. 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
